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Ideas from IDS: Graduate Papers from 2016/17 
It gives me great pleasure to present this first edition of published term papers authored by 
IDS graduates (2016/17) from across our suite of master’s degrees. At IDS, our vision is of 
equal and sustainable societies, locally and globally, where everyone can live secure, 
fulfilling lives free from poverty and injustice. Cutting-edge research, knowledge, and 
evidence is critical to realising this vision and shaping, informing, and navigating change. 
These papers make an essential contribution to this body of knowledge and current 
development debates. 
Each year, in September, IDS welcomes a new cohort of development scholars and 
practitioners who come to read and study for a master’s degree. They bring their experience 
and enthusiasm, their commitment to international development, and their ideas. We expect 
a lot from these scholars and practitioners during their time at IDS. We expect them to 
demonstrate, in their thinking and in their assignments, considerations of how to make a 
difference in the world. We ask them to help us extend our commitment to engaged 
excellence, to go beyond academic knowledge for its own sake and to use knowledge to help 
reduce inequalities, accelerate sustainability, and build more inclusive and secure societies. 
As illustrated in this issue, each year, our expectations are met and surpassed with papers 
which show creative reasoning and learning, and which in turn inform and shape our thinking 
at IDS, providing new perspectives, ideas, and applications. In the course of a year, over 
1,200 pieces of work are written and marked at IDS, much of it of fantastic quality. Obviously 
we cannot publish all of it, yet in producing this edition, we celebrate both these specific 
papers and the buzz generated by shared intellectual endeavours and from both individual 
and collective desires to bring about positive change. 
This issue makes an important contribution to major development challenges and deserves 
to be read. Some of the papers contribute to the theme of reducing inequalities. Lucy 
Heyderman (MA Gender and Development) has investigated the degree to which gender-
based violence initiatives, designed to prevent or respond to gender-based violence, might 
instead maintain or challenge gender inequalities. Rhea John (MA Development Studies) 
uses a power analysis to understand India’s initiative to capture citizens’ demographic and 
biometric information in a Unique Identification Project. Finally, in this reducing inequalities 
theme, Liam Kennedy (MA Poverty and Development) examines graduation from social 
protection programmes in Haiti. 
Two papers address the accelerating sustainability theme, yet they explore very different 
visions of sustainability, both of which are necessary for making a difference and bringing 
about positive change. Samuel Leistner (MA Globalisation, Business and Development) 
examines recent technological innovations in relation to developing countries’ manufacturing 
competitiveness and asks about the implications for industrial policy, whereas Alexander 
Vougioukas (MSc Climate Change, Development and Policy) explores the relationship 
between climate change and disaster risk. 
Most papers emphasise opportunities for building more inclusive and secure societies. Both 
C. Neu (MA Participation, Power and Social Change) and Aisha Modibo (MA Poverty and 
Development) focus on relationships, with Aisha examining the conceptualisation of citizen–
state engagement and C. Neu emphasising collaborative relationships. Luke Stannard (MA 
Development Studies) and Elena Wason (MA Governance, Development and Public Policy) 
focus on unruly politics in the UK, Luke in relation to education and Elena in relation to 
populism. 
Collectively, an incredible amount of learning went into the 2016/17 academic year, all of it 
collaborative, most of it now embedded in individuals, networks, and relationships. This issue 
captures a small proportion of our learning yet celebrates everyone’s contributions and looks 
forward to seeing IDS graduates making their mark on the world. 
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How Do Initiatives Designed to Prevent or 
Respond to Gender-Based Violence 
Challenge and/or Maintain Gender 
Inequalities? 
Lucy Heyderman 
1 Introduction 
When considering gender and development, gender-based violence (GBV) has been 
considered a key issue for development initiatives. Within this discourse, the word ‘gender’ 
has had a tendency to imply women (Chant and Gutmann 2002: 271). However, in the 1980s 
‘the new men’s studies’ (TNMS) emerged, which emphasised the male component of gender 
drawing upon the issues of masculinity, sexuality and power (Carrigan, Connell and Lee 
1985; Brod 1987; Connell 1987; Kimmel 1987). These explored the construction of manhood 
by considering how and why men act in certain ways. At first, feminist reviews expressed 
fears that TNMS would distract funding and resources from feminist research within gender 
studies (Griffin 1989: 104). The irony being that male issues would come to dominate an 
area of study, which had previously sought to liberate women. Some tensions still remain 
concerning the allocation of funds in gender and development projects that focus on men 
(Pease 2008: 8). Thus, it is necessary to ask: ‘what do men have to do with the 
empowerment of women?’ (Cornwall, Edström and Greig 2011: 16). 
In light of this question, I will be exploring how men and masculinities has become a useful 
tool for understanding and bettering gender relations in development. To do so, I will explore 
how the Sonke Gender Justice Network’s ‘One Man Can’ (OMC) programme in South Africa, 
has incorporated a masculinities approach into its anti-GBV project. The analysis will be split 
into three sections. The first section will begin with a brief introduction into masculinities, 
development, and the OMC initiative. The second section will demonstrate how the OMC has 
applied masculinities theories to challenge some of the gender inequalities that underpin 
GBV. The last section will consider some of the ways that the OMC initiative has failed to 
challenge gender inequalities. Using the OMC campaign as an example, I will support recent 
work conducted by Jewkes, Flood and Lang (2015: 1580), which argues that engaging men 
and boys is essential to development projects dealing with GBV. 
2 Masculinities, development and South Africa 
Foremost, it is important to understand how the study of ‘men and masculinities’ has been 
adopted into development projects that deal with gender issues. In terms of GBV, many 
initiatives work within a framework that positions women as victims, engaging men and boys 
to prevent violence against women. This can be within a school setting (Achyut 2011), in the 
community (Das et al. 2012), or even within institutions (Greig and Edström 2012). There is 
considerable evidence that this kind of approach works effectively, especially against male-
on-female sexual violence (see Barker, Ricardo and Nascimento 2007; Ricardo, Eads and 
Barker 2011). However, some studies have emphasised the need to look beyond the ‘men 
as perpetrators’ or ‘men as allies of women’ discourse in order to understand the social, 
political and economic issues that underpin gender inequalities (Jewkes et al. 2015). For 
instance, recent development work encompasses men as victims of GBV (see Lewis 2009; 
Lwambo 2011) and there is growing interest into how LGBT issues relate to masculinities 
(Edström 2011: 79). Given the vast range of issues concerning men and boys, it is necessary 
 © 2018 The Author © Institute of Development Studies 3 
to pinpoint where a project lies within the masculinities and development discourse. How has 
it engaged with broader, theoretical understandings of men and boys? 
The initiative that will be analysed in this paper is One Man Can (OMC) campaign in South 
Africa. Central to the philosophy of OMC is its focus on transforming gender roles and 
relations through interventions on masculinities (Dworkin 2015: 121). South Africa has some 
of the highest levels of domestic and sexual violence against women in the world (Dunkle et 
al. 2006: 231; Jewkes et al. 2009: 3). This makes South Africa a key place of focus for 
gender and development initiatives concerned with the prevention of violence against 
women. It should also be noted that the OMC campaign largely targets poor black South 
African men and much of the research considered in this essay focuses on rural Limpopo, 
Kwazulu Natal and the Eastern Cape (Dworkin et al. 2012; Dworkin 2015; Barker et al. 
2011). Therefore, when I talk about men, I must make it clear that I am referring to this 
demographic. The following section will analyse OMC’s engagement of these men and how a 
focus on masculinities can challenge gender inequalities? 
3 How OMC has challenged to gender inequalities 
I will begin by building a theoretical understanding of the relationship between gender, power 
and violence. As will be shown, these lie at the core of many studies concerning 
masculinities, especially those concerning the term ‘hegemonic masculinity’. Since the 
1980s, scholars have used it to refer to the constructed ideal of what it means to be a man 
(Connell and Messerschmidt 2005: 838). This identity reflects the dominant (most powerful) 
masculinity in a given culture. Significantly, as an ‘ideal’, it may be an abstract identity. 
Therefore, constructions of hegemonic masculinity may form unrealistic definitions of 
manliness. Moreover, it may be inferred that many men would aspire to act like it. In their 
significant work, Connell and Messerschmidt (2005) have provided key insights into the 
various meanings behind the term, asserting that multiple hegemonic masculinities exist 
across cultures and societies. The heterogeneous nature of this identity makes it context 
specific. Therefore, understanding this social construction enables development projects to 
explain why men behave a certain way in different societies. 
Following this, it is necessary to note how hegemonic masculinity relates to violence. During 
the 1990s, the term was used in research and policies, which looked into how and why 
military men and schoolboys acted in aggressive ways (see Barrett 1996; Denborough 
1996). Other studies also drew a clear line between hegemonic masculinities and forceful 
behaviour in sports (see Trujillo 1991: 292; Burgess, Edwards and Skinner 2003). In these 
highly masculinised environments, it would appear that dominant masculinities display 
aggressive behaviour. Interestingly, these acts of violence may be towards other men rather 
than women. Are these acts representative of hegemonic masculinities? Or do they reflect 
male attempts to achieve it? Montanya has posited that men display violence as a part of a 
‘power-over-others model’ in order to perform their male identity (cited in Greig and Edström 
2012). If this is true in a society (if masculinity is determined by power and violence) issues 
such as GBV and gender inequality will become norms. This negative depiction of 
masculinity closely relates power, violence and gender. 
However, there has been a backlash by masculinities scholars against the assumptions this 
creates. Hong has argued that in the United States, violent masculinities have become 
dominant through socialisation (Hong 2000: 296). This suggests that violence has become 
an expectation of men and boys. When the male gender role is ascribed certain 
characteristics, men will perform them, creating a self-fulfilling prophecy. These ideas about 
performance and gender roles have been explored at length in gender studies (see Butler 
1988, 1990). Although, there is no room for further discussion here, it is important to 
recognise how expectations of gender roles produce behaviour. If the ideal of masculinity is 
constructed as aggressive, then men and boys may act up to it. Understanding this reveals 
why some hegemonic masculinities produce violent male behaviour. Therefore, Connell and 
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Messerschmidt argue that hegemonic masculinities must be reconstructed to achieve gender 
equality (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005: 853). Hegemonic masculinities do not have to 
cause violence. However, the relationship between power and violence must be severed if 
GBV is to be challenged. 
Before taking a closer look at OMC’s campaign, it is necessary to briefly expand upon the 
idea of ‘troubled masculinities’ or ‘men in crisis’ (Chant and Gutmann 2002: 271). Indeed, not 
all violent behaviour can simply be understood in terms of hegemonic masculinities. 
Important insights into the root causes of violence can be found in Moser and McIlwaine’s 
study of rural Columbian communities (Moser and McIlwaine 2000). She has used local 
understandings of violence to create a useful diagram to demonstrate the multi-faceted 
nature of violence in a rural Columbian community (ibid.: 30): 
Figure 3.1 Causal impact diagram of interrelationships among intra-family violence, 
violence between neighbours, and violence over land in Colombia Chiquita, Aguazul, 
prepared by a mixed group of nine adults 
 
Source: Moser and McIlwaine (2000: 30) ‘Urban Poor Perceptions of Violence and Exclusion in Colombia’. © World Bank. 
License: CC BY 3.0 IGO, https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ 
Moser and McIlwaine’s work is not alone. In other settings, scholars have shown that violent 
masculinities emerge out of crises of disempowerment (see Silberschmidt 2005). These 
works emphasise a need to create more in depth discussions of the roots of GBV from the 
standpoint of men and boys. 
Having provided some insight into the theories surrounding the relationship between violence 
and men and masculinities, I will now reflect on its relevance to the South African context. 
How is masculinity perceived in South Africa? Research has revealed that it is a strongly 
patriarchal society. Indeed, an IMAGES survey found that 85% of men believed being a man 
meant being ‘tough’ (Barker et al. 2011: 66). Additionally, 60% believed the man should hold 
the decision making power in the household and around 50% believed women deserved to 
be beaten at times (ibid.). Consequently, South Africa scored lowest out of any country on 
the IMAGES Gender Equitable Scale (ibid.). These figures reflect a society in which women 
are the subordinate group – they are the victims. As has been said, the OMC project is built 
upon this assumption. Evidently, power, gender and violence are key issues in this setting. 
Given this, I will explore how OMC’s campaign attempts to tackle these by engaging men 
and boys to counter gender inequalities and GBV. Its core strategy is to deconstruct ideas 
about the prevailing hegemonic masculinity. The purpose of this is to create a more equal, 
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progressive set of gender norms. OMC does so through a series of workshops. These cover 
the topics of ‘gender and power, critical reflections on the norms and practices associated 
with hegemonic masculinity, gender and violence, gender and HIV/AIDS, healthy 
relationships, and taking action for social change’ (Dworkin et al. 2012: 186). It is clear that 
the running theme in these workshops is the relationship between gender, violence and 
power. Considerable advances have been made through these workshops in terms of 
readjusting male views of women. Indeed, men interviewed after the workshops noted that 
they had gained an awareness of woman’s rights (ibid.). One man recognised that his 
‘childhood observations of man as boss were wrong’ and ‘then realized that it is wrong to 
treat women like they do not exist’ (Lim quoted in Dworkin et al. 2012: 189). In connection to 
Hong’s argument, Lim’s words suggest a socialisation of gender inequalities. The ‘boss’ 
mentality reflects a hegemonic masculinity that is built upon the subordination of others. 
Thus, OMC’s campaign is key in challenging male attitudes towards women and other men 
so that more equal relationships can be formed. 
Workshops have also engaged with masculinities scholarship to demonstrate that certain 
masculine behaviours have a cost (see Courtenay 2000 cited in Dworkin et al. 2012: 186). 
This reflects an earlier study carried out by Messner (1992), which revealed the emotional 
and physical harm that hegemonic masculine behaviour inflicts one’s own health. In the 
context of South Africa, the link between HIV and violence has been considered key issues 
(Dunkle et al. 2006; Jewkes et al. 2009, 2011). Moreover, Rachel Jewkes and Robert Morell 
have argued that the prevailing hegemonic masculinity in South Africa has made women 
more vulnerable to violence and HIV risk – especially when they submit to it (Jewkes and 
Morell 2010: 7). This is a manifestation of male power and control in heterosexual 
performance (Jewkes et al. 2011: 2). Consequently, young women (between the ages of 15-
24) are around four times more likely to be infected with HIV then men (Muula 2008: 423). 
This is clearly a concern of gender inequity as well as health. 
However, by exposing the potential harm men can do to themselves by acting in certain 
ways, it may become possible to shift concepts of masculinity. For instance, one participant 
disclosed that OMC’s workshops had shown him the risks of HIV and had begun wearing a 
condom (much to his girlfriend’s relief) (Dworkin et al. 2012: 192). Others noted how they had 
changed their perceptions of manhood and no longer equated sexual promiscuity or 
aggression with manliness or power (ibid.). By challenging gender norms in this way, OMC 
participants have detached violent behaviour from the hegemonic masculinity. This has 
undermined the relationship between violence, gender and power, producing a safer 
environment for men and women, as well as more equal gender relations. 
The OMC’s campaign has also paid attention to why harmful behaviours arise in an attempt 
to challenge the cause of gender inequalities. Its work has addressed masculinities as a 
product of history, as well as structural and social issues. Indeed, studies have linked the 
prevalence of GBV to South Africa’s troubled history: from struggles against colonialism to 
continued racial discrimination (Bennett 2010; Kraak and Simpson 1998; Mills and 
Ssewakaringa 2005). Building on this, in Morrell and Morrell’s study of masculinities, they 
argued that the majority of the violence committed by men is a symptom of men feeling 
powerless (Morrell and Morrell 2011: 123). Taking these on board, OMC has attempted to 
locate its campaign within a discourse of social justice (Dworkin et al. 2012: 186). This 
recognition of the discrimination against poor black men in history opens up a discussion of 
racial inequality. It makes the programme more sensitive to the ways in which men have felt 
powerless. By doing so, it may be easier to challenge other forms of inequality – such as 
gender inequality. Importantly, this history unites men and women. By uncovering these roots 
of social discontent, it becomes possible to tackle gender inequalities. 
The issue of male powerlessness has also been tackled in other ways. Research has shown 
how violent behaviour can be linked to ‘rigid gender attitudes’, alcoholism and witnessing or 
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experiencing violence in childhood (Peacock and Barker 2014: 579). The foremost of these 
has already been discussed in OMC’s work on hegemonic masculinities. The latter two are 
problems that impact men and boys directly, producing unhealthy environments in which 
violence may occur. 
Challenging alcoholism has been a key focus of OMC’s programme. This harmful behaviour 
is associated with poverty and unemployment amongst men (Boonzaier and Rey 2003: 
1022). In South Africa, it has also been linked to male violence against women (ibid.). On of 
OMC’s participants disclosed ‘I was…violent in my drunken states and would sometimes 
physically assault my girlfriend’ (Dworkin 2015: 145). Thus, alcohol can be seen as a catalyst 
for GBV in situations of male disempowerment. Therefore, bringing down rates of alcoholism 
can be seen to reduce GBV. Remarkably, in a community involved with OMC, a third of men 
had reduced their alcohol intake (ibid.). Several men have described how drinking less has 
changed their relationships with their girlfriends and others (ibid.: 145–55). Reducing 
alcoholism is beneficial to the man himself as well as those around him. This refers back to 
Moser and McIlwaine’s diagram. If projects are able to tackle the roots of causes of why men 
behave violently, then a more sustainable change will be made. 
Lastly, reducing violence in the home has also had success. An evaluation of masculinity in 
South Africa found that men who had experienced childhood violence displayed less 
emotional responsiveness when committing violence themselves (Jewkes et al. 2015). This 
implies that violence creates violence as it becomes normalised in society. To tackle this, the 
OMC project has built a strategy focusing on the social constructions of fatherhood that use 
authoritarian discipline (Van den Berg et al. 2013). For example, one participant stopped 
being ‘a very strict man and a disciplinarian…[in] rough in a way’ (54-year-old, five children 
quoted in Van den Berg et al. 2013). Instead, he praised ‘those young men at Sonke’ who 
‘taught…different ways of disciplining children’ (ibid.). The authoritarian father can be seen 
as a symbol of power within the home. A person to be both admired and feared. By providing 
an alternative to this masculine identity, households will no longer reproduce gender 
inequalities. This approach has a double-pronged affect. It tackles both violent actions in the 
present, and the self-perpetuating system of violence. 
At the core of all these approaches is the reconstruction of masculinities. Drawing upon 
understandings of hegemonic and subordinate masculinities, OMC has managed to 
challenge some of the causal factors of GBV and gender inequality in South African 
communities. 
4 How OMC maintains gender inequalities 
In this last section, I will assess how the OMC campaign has maintained an essentialist 
notion of men and women. To explore this, I will pinpoint two key issues in relation to the 
broader masculinities scholarship. Firstly, I will look at the projects treatment of men as 
perpetrators and women as victims. Then I will consider the lack of attention OMC has given 
to violence directed towards LGBT people. By doing so, this section will question whether 
OMC, as a GBV-prevention project, has maintained problematic binaries that perpetuate 
gender inequalities. 
It has already been noted that the OMC’s campaign focuses on men as the perpetrators of 
violence. In terms of general development projects, this discourse has been noted as a 
superficial model for understanding violence (Moser and Clark 2001: 4). Crucially, it feeds 
essentialisations of gender, which in turn perpetuates a gender binary that reduces men and 
women to universalistic stereotypes (ibid.). The concern with this is that it is assumed that 
violence is inherent in masculine identities. This stereotype stems from a broader tendency 
to create negative depictions of men and masculinities (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005: 
840). Stereotyping either gender undermines understandings of gender relations. In terms of 
violence, it might obscure the true causes of GBV; it ignores the fact that men can be victims 
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too and it might be the cause of male hostility towards gender equality campaigns. 
Furthermore, engaging men and boys in development projects has often meant seeing men 
as either perpetrators or allies (Jewkes et al. 2015: 1583). However, a combination of these 
factors may marginalise male issues. If these go unaddressed, then gender inequalities will 
be maintained. 
Given the criticisms of categorising ‘men as perpetrators’ or ‘allies of women’, I will consider 
how these relate to OMC’s work. I will be asking if treating men as perpetrators should be 
considered a key issue. In an interview, one OMC participant said that ‘the one thing men 
ask most is why OMC is focused on men only’, whilst others felt like ‘culprits’ and 
‘perpetrators’ (quoted in Dworkin 2015: 153). These defensive and hostile reactions suggest 
that some men felt OMC was all blaming men for GBV. This implies that essentialistic, 
negative ideas have been constructed of South African men in workshops. Although this is 
not the message OMC was trying to deliver, it provokes some concern about the 
effectiveness of its communication with participants. Furthermore, South Africa has a high 
prevalence of male-on-male violence (Peacock et al. 2006: 25). Therefore, a man might be a 
victim not a perpetrator, or even both. By maintaining the trope of ‘men as perpetrators’ some 
individuals may feel marginalised by the project. 
However, it should be noted that this was not the general feeling amongst men interviewed 
(Dworkin et al. 2012: 191). Given the context, it might be argued that the ‘men as 
perpetrators’ is a necessary assumption to make. Moreover, OMC does not only treat men 
as perpetrators or allies of women. It looks beyond this to causal factors behind male 
violence – the societal and cultural norms that perpetuate it. Therefore, it is important to note 
is that the decision to engage with men and boys has some disadvantages. Peacock and 
Barker have warned that campaigns like OMC should not impose their programme on men, 
but look to work with men, women and the community (Peacock and Barker 2014: 593). 
Unfortunately, there is a lack of research on how men interacted with wives, girlfriends and 
the community after the programme (Dworkin 2015: 157). With more insight into this, it will 
be possible to see whether OMC’s messages about harmful masculine behaviour have been 
communicated effectively to challenge GBV and inequalities. 
The second key issue is the silence surrounding violence against homosexuality. It should be 
noted that other LGBT people have also been excluded. In fact, there has been a tendency 
in gender and development to exclude sexual violence against LGBT people and sex 
workers from GBV debates (Edström 2011: 79). Having said this, homosexuality is the only 
LGBT issue discussed by OMC workers. Therefore, I will be focusing on the relationship 
between homosexuality and masculinity. During the 1970s, Morin and Garfinkle identified 
homophobia as a part of mainstream masculine culture (Morin and Garfinkle 1978: 39–40). 
At this time, the separation of men and ‘gays’ was even reflected in sociological 
understandings of masculinity – homosexuality was considered an inferior form of 
masculinity (see Tolson 1977). This perception meant that gay men were ignored or 
excluded from academic conceptions of hegemonic masculinity (Carrigan et al. 1985: 577). 
The subordination of homosexuality in masculinities studies and in real life is on of the issues 
that TNMS attempted to challenge (ibid.). The fact that LGBT people are still ignored in 
development conversations today reflects a gap in addressing gender issues. 
Given that South Africa was the first country in the world to introduce LGBT rights into its 
constitution, it may be assumed that there would be a more open discourse concerning GBV 
targeted at LGBT communities. Yet, it is clear that this was not reflected in OMC’s campaign 
(see Sonke). Indeed, Sonke staff report high levels of homophobia amongst men who 
engaged with the project (Viitanen and Colvin 2015). Accordingly, ‘staff and support group 
leaders often reported being able to do little in terms of challenging these norms’ (ibid.). 
Clearly, this is an area where gender inequalities are still being maintained. It may be a 
difficult area to traverse. Indeed, it would appear that the legal rights of homosexuals and 
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their cultural acceptance stand far apart. Problematically, OMC’s reconstruction of the 
masculine identity excludes homosexual males. It also excludes transgender men or any 
other identity that does not fit the hetero-normative male model. This perpetuates certain 
assumptions about masculinity that may lead to marginalisation or even violence. In this way, 
the OMC campaign sustains problematic gender norms and relations. 
5 Conclusion 
Overall, the OMC’s campaign provides a convincing example of how anti-GBV campaigns 
that engage men and boys can challenge gender inequalities. By highlighting harmful 
behaviour and reconstructing concepts of masculinities men and boys have been able to 
challenge their own ideas about power, gender and violence. Rather than using violence as a 
means for power, more equitable gender relationships have been formed. Moreover, OMC 
has proved effective in tackling some of the problems facing men such as HIV and 
alcoholism. These successes show that although OMC has used broader ideas about 
masculinities to inform the campaign, it is still context specific. Yet, this focus on men has 
caused some concerns. In particular, the rhetoric that places ‘men as perpetrators’ remains a 
key issue. Additionally, more needs to be done to move gender and development projects 
beyond hetero-normative assumptions. This is needed to create an inclusive framework that 
addresses the needs of all citizens. With this in mind, the OMC’s project illustrates that men 
are key actors in the empowerment of women. By understanding how and why men behave 
in certain ways, gender and development projects move closer to gender equality and ending 
GBV. 
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A Power Analysis of the Unique 
Identification Project in India 
Rhea John 
1 Introduction 
The Unique ID programme or UID, initiated by the Government of India in 2007, is an attempt 
to create a complete database of all residents of India based on their demographic and 
biometric information, and to provide a unique identifying number to each of them. The vision 
of the first Chief Executive of the UID Authority (UIDAI), Nandan Nilekani, was of a single 
unified ID and database that, when integrated with government functions, would circumvent 
corruption in the welfare delivery process, enable financial inclusion, have a ‘dramatic, 
cleansing effect on land productivity, equity and litigation’ through transparent land records, 
and create a new ‘governance model’ based on more equitable access to information, 
among other benefits (Nilekani 2009). Each of these acts suggests a transformation in 
relations between the state and its citizens, in particular the marginalised, and denotes a shift 
in, and an act of, power. 
This vision of the UID’s role assumed that greater visibility of the citizen to the state would 
translate into greater transparency of state to citizen. Yet this overlooks the nature of the UID 
as an ‘invited space’: it invalidates the agency exercised to gain the right to visibility, and 
transforms the achievement into a benevolent but opaque gesture. This paper therefore 
seeks to highlight the processes and relations of power implicit in the design of the UID, and 
argues that this shift from claimed to invited space is a co-optation of ‘empowerment’ by 
governmentality. 
In order to recognise the forms of power at work, this paper uses the ‘power cube’ framework 
and Foucault’s concepts of ‘biopower’ and ‘governmentality’ to analyse the kind of power 
exerted by and through the UID (Foucault 1997; Gaventa 2006). These approaches focus on 
the relational and contextual nature of power, and help to uncover the mechanisms through 
which such power is exercised. From a Foucauldian perspective, the UID as a mechanism of 
power constructs a relationship between governor and governed based on the custody of 
knowledge, both specifically about the individual as well as about the ‘population’ as a whole. 
At the same time, it also limits the ambit of government to (the bodies of) ‘citizens’, enacting 
disciplinary power through its definition of who is a citizen. The UIDAI itself however 
disclaims responsibility for deciding or enacting these definitions, and restricts its role to 
verifying the identity of residents, downplaying its own power even as it claims centrality in 
state functioning in a technologised future (Sharma 2010). 
2 Identification 
Both the need and the authority to verify that ‘X is X’, or that a resident is in fact who he/she 
claims to be, are exercises of national sovereignty. James Scott has argued that the act of 
enumerating citizens is part of the strategy of ‘simplification’ used by the state to increase the 
‘legibility’ of its citizenry (Scott 1998). Increasing legibility creates a ‘metric’ that helps to 
order information about the population, discover gaps, and create the illusion of omniscience 
necessary for interventions (ibid.) In the process, the role of the state as provider, regulator 
and final court of appeal is established, through an act of invisible power. 
In the case of the UID, it is argued that definitive identification helps in easier planning and 
implementation of welfare delivery, in particular by enabling financial inclusion and direct 
cash transfers into bank accounts. The benefits of this change are that from the state’s 
perspective, this would remove ‘phantoms’ or false claimants to welfare in the system and 
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reduce the potential for inclusion errors; from the citizens’ side, it would reduce the time and 
cost of accessing entitlements, and the indignity of suspicion and denial based on ‘subjective’ 
judgements. Within this framework, it is notable that the exclusion of those not currently able 
to claim welfare is not a priority. The major process innovation in the identification process is 
rather making available the collected identities in a centralised format, verifiable through 
‘objective’ technological processes. This could be seen as de-duplication across multiple 
existing forms of documentation, rather than as adding a new and more inclusive avenue to 
acquiring legal status. This fails to broaden, and might even narrow, the path to accessing 
legal rights and entitlements for the marginalised. 
The claim of the UID to be ‘objective’ because it is impersonal, is in itself a claim to power. 
Such power invalidates ‘politics’ as negotiation and creates for itself a hidden power, that of 
exercising subjective judgement without appearing to do so. Biometric technology and its 
claim to treating all people the same, unlike demographic data that can be used to 
‘discriminate’ between populations, are essential to this claim. This pits technology against 
the previous dominant avatar of the state, the ‘subjective’ and thus corrupt bureaucratic 
machinery. The use of multiple indicators, including fingerprints, iris scans and basic 
demographic information, increases the authority of the verification (while increasing the 
margin of error in enrolment) (Ramanathan 2013). 
What strengthens this claim to objectivity is the apparent ‘purposelessness’ of the information 
collected. The UID, unlike other forms of identification such as the ration card, passport, 
driving licence or voter card, does not identify a population for a specific purpose. Therefore 
it does not have a motivation for misrecognition built into it, or might provide multiple 
conflicting motivations, given its multiple uses. This is fundamental in turn to the notion of 
‘interoperability’—between government departments, but also between state and other 
economic actors—that the UID database will enable. 
At a deeper level, ‘purposelessness’ links up to Webster’s argument that the concept of 
‘information’ in theories about the information society is seen as absolutely powerful because 
its worth is no longer related to its ‘semantic content’ (Webster 1995: 27). Thus, Nilekani is 
able to assume that generating data that allows ‘identification’ will create free and 
transparent flows of information about identity (or about all the policy-relevant parts of this 
complex characteristic), and that this information will soon flow in both directions, promote 
transparency and accountability, and simplify acts of negotiation by levelling the ‘information 
asymmetry’. Yet the fact of a database existing does none of these things, in particular given 
concerns about privacy of data collected. The equitable sharing of information—and the 
equitable privacy of parts of it—remains off the agenda, and thus part of the ‘hidden power’ 
exerted in convening this ‘invited space’. 
3 Functionality 
What then is the positive value, or ‘semantic content’, of the information collected for the 
UID? Ramachandran argues that the purpose of enumeration is the ‘governmentality of 
unease’ (Ramachandran 2015: 116). One of the methods used to achieve this, in her 
account, is by distinguishing residents of India (who are all entitled to a UID) from citizens. 
The question remains as to whose unease is being controlled—that of the government with 
an illegible population, of better-off populations concerned about their security, or of the 
unregistered poor concerned about the rejection of their identities. While in reality, as with 
the situation of Bangladeshi migrants, the meaning of citizenship involves a complex 
negotiation between documentary status and ‘belonging’ to the mythical ‘unified national 
identity’ (ibid.: 116), the UID’s objectives elide the identification of residents with the 
recognition of citizens, evading the question altogether. When asked directly, Nilekani 
asserted that the question of which residents were citizens is not within the UID’s mandate 
(cited in Sarkar 2014: 517). It becomes questionable whether it can then solve the 
bottlenecks of entitlements delivery. More significantly, the UID then becomes a necessary, 
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but not sufficient condition for proving identity. The claim of jettisoning uncertainty and 
inconsistency is undermined. Ramachandran also argues that this new mode of asserting the 
power to identify is an attempt to recoup on the Indian state’s past failures to securely identify 
its citizens—as evidenced in the plethora of ‘fake IDs’ existing in the country (Ramachandran 
2015). Control over the database of the ‘Aadhaar’ (meaning ‘basis’, in Hindi) of all identity 
then represents a reassertion of sovereignty by the state, which is perhaps the relatively 
abstract semantic content of the UID. 
The sovereign right to identify is asserted by the right to exclude. This represents another act 
of governmentality, that of according legitimacy to its citizens and their citizenship. It is an act 
of bureaucracy, which is to be counterbalanced by the according of legitimacy by citizens to 
the state through democratic process. The UID critiques past forms of identification on the 
basis that they require non-universal and exclusionary criteria for identification, such as a 
residential address, birth registration or certification by officials, which exclude extremely 
marginalised populations, such as the homeless or those living in remote rural areas (remote 
to centres of government). While it technically excludes no resident of India, the UID 
establishes nothing on its own—and in order to make someone eligible for any right or 
entitlement, must so far take recourse to the previous methods of identification—for instance 
to establish Below Poverty Line Status for food subsidies. Furthermore, in practice even 
biometric data is not as ‘inclusive’ as it claims—for instance, it can be very difficult to obtain 
usable fingerprints from those who perform hard manual labour (Ramanathan 2013) and it is 
obviously difficult to use it as a verification mechanism in places where there is unstable 
access to the necessary technological infrastructure. 
The focus on inclusion errors and identity verification expressed in the sovereign right of 
identification are also not without their purpose. This relates to the distribution of welfare 
provisioning, and the shift in focus converts what is a hard-won ‘claimed space’—of public 
provisioning of food, employment, education, subsidised agricultural inputs, and so on—into 
an ‘invited space’ where the ‘legitimate’ and ‘deserving’ are granted access. To enact this, 
the UID, like the ‘poverty line’, appropriates to a technical realm the onus to decide whether a 
person is poor or a citizen, even in the absence of social-cultural context, history and self-
identification. For instance, while the UID originally allowed ‘introducers’, or others from the 
community, to establish the claims of a particular applicant, the uptake and perhaps 
relevance of this measure for inclusion appears poor—perhaps those who have others to 
speak for them have routes to other existing forms of identification (Khera 2015). Foucault’s 
notion of biopower offers one explanation for this indifference towards the exclusion of 
individuals. Biopower assumes that the body is a transparent, measurable truth to the 
statistician, and that the truth of the individual—in this case, whether he/she is included in the 
‘universal’ database—is off-point. To the database, the ‘statistical significance’, rather than 
the demographic characteristics of the excluded population are relevant measures of the 
success of the enumeration strategy. 
4 Incorporation 
The third task of the UID, in addition to identification and according entitlements, is 
‘incorporation’, or the integration of enumerated individuals into a population or a citizenry. 
Foucault argues that the vision of biopower—of a mass of bodies or population as a 
statistic—has the ultimate objective of ensuring ‘a sort of homeostasis’ (Foucault 1997: 246), 
as the ‘body is replaced by general biological processes’, the average of which is sought to 
be maintained by the state (ibid.: 249). In this situation, the transition from disciplinary to 
biopower is seen by different observers to mark different regimes of governance. Some 
suggest that the attempt to exhaustively record residents is a drive, renewed by technological 
innovation, to achieve the bureaucratic ‘fantasy of panopticism’ (Breckenridge quoted in 
Sarkar 2014: 518). Others suggest that bringing residents into the information network 
forcibly incorporates them in the (financialised) market economy—and that big data itself is a 
highly valuable commodity (Shukla 2010). A more positive explanation is that the UID 
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identifies bodies so as not to restrict them to the static correlates of their identity, and enable 
free movement within the country, which would for instance unprecedently include nomadic 
and pastoralist populations (suggested in Ramachandran 2015). Each of these represents 
the collection of information as a purposeful unification of the body politic, economic or 
geographic by bureaucratic means, and thus a corresponding loss (as well as a historical 
failure) of the democratic means and potential to achieve the same. 
The UID also suggests a picture of a particular ‘bureaucratic’ way of knowing: decoupling 
positionality from circumstance as elements of identity. Normalising this way of seeing 
institutionalises the exclusion of ‘practical knowledge’ (Scott 1998), and replaces other 
governmental ways of knowing—the elite/colonial deposition before a magistrate, for 
instance, or the ration card certified by the village. It individualises and depersonalises the 
recognition of the citizen by the state, and weakens the capacity for direct contact and 
collective action vis-à-vis the state, which is often driven by solidarities of social identity 
rather than shared individual self-interest. 
The Unique ID project has now enrolled over a billion Indian residents, as of April 2016. In 
itself, this is a mammoth achievement of technology and organisation. Yet, as the above 
analysis has established, the project is implicated in complex configurations of power, in 
proportion to its scale of success. Visible power is enacted to demand that all residents of 
India make themselves visible to the state, for their own good. Hidden power is used to 
ensure that the uses to which this visibility can be put are restricted to the rules established 
by the government for its invited spaces of public provisioning and administration. 
Simultaneously, invisible power is at work, structuring state-citizen relations and embedding 
in social and political consciousness a particular role for the state. The result of the operation 
of these forms of power is the capture of achievements and spaces that were claimed by 
democratic participation, by the bureaucratic apparatus of the state. All these will come into 
play, arguably, on the day that the government considers its database to be ‘complete’ and 
sufficient for its purposes. The Indian government has, for instance, a troubled history of 
setting ‘cut-off dates’ for legitimate citizenship, for instance with the 1983 Illegal Migrants 
(Determination by Tribunals) Act in Assam (Kashyap 2016). While the situations are not 
analogous, they share a sense that lines can be drawn around people as around territory at a 
particular point in time, and the population determined as a finite entity. This marks off the 
future from an India of the past wherein distress migrants from surrounding countries were 
made welcome and settled by the government, particularly after 1971. Through this, not only 
the power of India, but the status of India as a ‘power’ in geopolitical terms will be signalled. 
In conclusion, the paper tries to draw out the ways in which the UID as a method for bringing 
the marginalised closer to the state itself becomes tangled in the politics it seeks to evade. Its 
design, relying heavily on technical solutions and abbreviated ideas of the process of 
empowerment, vests power with technocratic authorities at the cost of the democratic 
processes through which the demand for inclusion was felt. 
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Graduation as Transformation? A Case 
Study of Fonkoze’s CLM Programme in 
Haiti 
Liam Kennedy 
1 Introduction 
The world is not on track to achieve the first Sustainable Development Goal of eradicating 
extreme poverty by 2030 (ODI 2015). Despite recent progress, with some estimating the 
number of people in extreme poverty to be falling by as much as 130,000 a day (Roser 
2016), millions will still live below the US$1.90 a day threshold in over a decade’s time. 
Graduation programmes have emerged as a means of improving the standard of living of this 
demographic who typically lie beyond the reach of traditional social protection (SP) 
measures. With a holistic package of support that has been proven to increase income and 
wellbeing for the ultra-poor (Banerjee et al. 2015), these programmes may chime well with 
the transformative social protection (TSP) agenda. The ethos of which is to ‘integrate 
individuals equally into society, allow everyone to take advantage of the benefits of growth 
and enable excluded or marginalised groups to claim their rights’ (Sabates-Wheeler and 
Devereux 2008: 70). 
Influenced by the extended livelihoods approach, this essay will examine the potential for 
transformation ‘across scales, from the micro to the macro, and across analytical frames, 
from the detailed and empirical to the conceptual and theorised’ (Scoones 2015: 155). This 
approach permits an assessment of the transformative impact of graduation programmes 
across distinct actors and power relations whilst highlighting the importance of the 
connections and feedbacks between structural features and the lived realities of the poor. 
In the following, I will first outline the conceptual underpinnings of the TSP framework and 
relate its advent to both previous thinking around social protection and wider bodies of 
literature on inclusive citizenship and empowerment. Thereafter, graduation and the politics 
of such programmes are introduced before analysing evidence across a range of countries at 
both the micro and macro level. Haiti and the Chemin Lavi Mayò programme are then 
explored in greater detail. The subsequent discussion calls for more expansive evaluation 
methodologies that match the scope of the transformative agenda before concluding. 
2 Theoretical framework 
2.1 Why micro and macro? 
Above all, it is important to begin with a justification for using the extended livelihoods1 
framework. The distinction between affirmative and transformative remedies to social 
injustice long pre-dated the emergence of the transformative social protection framework. 
Whilst the former ‘aimed at correcting outcomes of social arrangements without disturbing 
the underlying framework that generates them [inequitable outcomes]… [the latter] aimed at 
correcting inequitable outcomes precisely by restructuring the underlying generative 
framework’ (Fraser 1997: 23). Scoones (2015: 79) highlights this ‘underlying framework’ as a 
crucial component of any analysis; ‘livelihoods are not isolated and independent but tied to 
what is happening elsewhere, both locally and more broadly.’ 
                                               
1
 See Chambers and Conway (1992) for a fuller explanation of earlier livelihoods thinking. 
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If TSP aims to genuinely ‘integrate individuals equally into society, allow everyone to take 
advantage of the benefits of growth and enable excluded or marginalised groups to claim 
their rights’ (Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux 2008: 70), then an analysis of the local is 
clearly insufficient. Analyses have ‘to be complemented with an understanding of the wider, 
structural and relational dynamics that shape localities and livelihoods’ (Scoones 2015: 115). 
These realities inform both the structure and the conceptual underpinnings of this paper. 
2.2 From protection to transformation 
Over the past few decades, there has been an ever-increasing interest in SP2 as a means of 
reducing poverty and promoting development (Barrientos and Hulme 2008; ILO 2014). 
Combined with a slowly emerging consensus regarding the limits of trickle-down economics 
(Jolly 1991), the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s reinforced the need for social safety 
nets and solidified SP ‘as an important component in policies to manage risks and shocks’ 
(Gentilini and Omamo 2011: 330). 
As development thinking evolved throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, ‘the broader 
potential of social protection began to be recognised, [with] bigger claims… being made for 
what social protection can and should strive to achieve’ (Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux 
2008: 64). The TSP agenda was an attempt to move beyond narrower and more residual 
conceptions of social protection as safety nets and social transfers to ‘empower the poor and 
transform the conditions in which they struggle to construct viable livelihoods’ (Sabates-
Wheeler and Devereux 2008: 81). 
The concept of transformation goes beyond the protective, preventive and promotive 
measures found in conventional social protection frameworks (see Figure 2.1). Embedded 
into this framework is a broader conceptualisation of vulnerability and poverty that 
incorporates structural inequalities and concerns for social justice. Carroll (2011: 90) neatly 
pens the ethos of TSP as aiming ‘not only to transfer resources but… to transfer power.’ 
However, the overly-ambitious scope of the framework has invited some critiques. ‘The 
breadth of transformative social protection, which covers everything from crisis-induced relief 
to political action, seems to address almost all aspects of the development agenda’ (Aoo et 
al. 2007: 30). Although not necessarily a condemnation per se, it is true that TSP requires a 
multitude of inputs to enact change. For example, prerequisites for sustainable and realisable 
transformation include: processes of collaborative governance and decision-making (Chopra 
and te Lintelo 2011); the presence of empowered users and ‘catalytic social movements’ 
(Tessitore 2011) and political buy-in (Hickey 2009, 2011). 
Consequently, there is a sizeable overlap between TSP and wider bodies of literature on 
inclusive citizenship and empowerment. As Kabeer (2005: 22–23) argues ‘it is the collective 
struggles of excluded groups which have historically driven processes of social 
transformation… [yet] the conundrum, of course, is how such collective action for inclusion or 
transformation can be organised by those whose exclusion is premised precisely on their 
lack of organisational power.’ Reviewing the huge literature on power is beyond this scope of 
this essay but there are a few pioneering contributions that are related to Carroll’s (2011) 
earlier assertion. Arendt (1970: 44) posited that ‘power is never the property of an individual; 
it belongs to a group and remains in existence only so long as the group keeps together’ 
whilst Giddens (1984: 14) wrote that ‘an agent ceases to be such if he or she loses the 
capability to “make a difference”, that is, to exercise some sort of power’. 
                                               
2
 See Conway, De Haan, and Norton (2000) for a full explanation of the various social protection definitions and concepts. 
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Figure 2.1 A Conceptual Framework for Social Protection 
 
Source: Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux (2007: 26). © Institute of Development Studies, reproduced with permission. 
Given the raison d’etre of the TSP agenda, these conceptualisations of power are extremely 
relevant. Giddens’ (1984) nod to gendered differences is also important given that many 
graduation programmes have predominantly female beneficiaries. As such, these 
programmes often imbue attempts at female empowerment with the literature highlighting the 
overwhelming need for recognition, reduction and redistribution of unpaid care work (Elson 
2010) to alleviate time stress/poverty (Antonopoulus and Hirway 2010). 
At a global level, the UN (2016) have reported four systemic constraints to female 
empowerment – adverse social norms, discriminatory laws and lack of legal protection, 
unpaid care work and lack of access to assets – although the experience of these constraints 
is multifarious and specific to individuals in certain contexts. Kabeer’s (1999) framework for 
assessing empowerment across the immediate, intermediate and deeper levels of 
marginalisation is exemplar of the kind of approach needed when assessing transformation. 
One final work of relevance here is that of Buvinic and Furst-Nichols (2014: 70), whose 
systematic review found that ‘very poor women need a more intensive package of services 
than do less poor women (and poor men) to break out of subsistence production.’ 
2.3 The emergence of graduation 
Graduation programmes stemmed from this realisation that many SP instruments were 
neither accessible nor suitably designed for the ultra-poor (see Halder and Mosley 2004; 
Barrientos and Hulme 2008). For example, evidence from Bangladesh consistently found 
that the ultra-poor were excluded from microfinance initiatives (Rahman and Razzaque 2000) 
which echoed earlier calls for more multifaceted approaches to reaching the most deprived. 
Thus, the graduation model was born in the shape of BRAC’s ‘Challenging the Frontiers of 
Poverty Reduction – Targeting the Ultra-Poor’ (CFPR-TUP) programme. For which, ‘the 
theory of change starts from the recognition that a single intervention such as a cash transfer 
is unlikely to achieve a transformative impact on poor people’s livelihoods, but a holistic 
package of support has the potential to construct a pathway out of poverty towards 
sustainable self-reliance’ (Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler 2015: 2). Graduation programmes 
are, thus, a holistic package of support that often includes cash and/or asset transfers, some 
form of income-generation training and access to credit and/or health services for a finite 
period (see Hashemi and Umaira 2011). 
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Whilst there is growing evidence of the success of these programmes (see Banerjee et al. 
2015), rigorous debate remains. Important distinctions need to be made between threshold 
and sustainable graduation where the former arises when beneficiaries reach a certain 
benchmark, be it demographic, socioeconomic or time spent within the programme, with the 
latter incorporating notions of resilience, implying that ‘graduates should not fall back into 
poverty soon after they exit’ (Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler 2015: 3). 
More theoretical critiques have labelled graduation ‘a neoliberal vision of social policy’ which 
reflects deeply embedded prejudices about welfare revision (Kidd 2013). Others have 
questioned the potential for transformation with a focus on ‘technofixes’ (Reddy 2013) that 
operate in isolation of their macro-context. Empirical constraints have been highlighted by 
Roelen (2015) who argues that there is still much unknown about the impacts of graduation 
on children and the intergenerational transmission of poverty. Referring to development 
programmes more widely, Copestake (2008: 548) claimed that ‘analysing programmes solely 
with respect to material wellbeing, while important can be misleading because it fails to 
capture their full meaning to intended beneficiaries and other stakeholders [as] any social 
assistance programme is embedded in a web of social relationships that is moulded in turn 
by strong beliefs and values’. 
2.4 The politics of graduation 
There are bigger questions involving the implementation of graduation programmes. Recent 
findings from the Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium Panel (cited by Lind 2017) have 
shown little evidence of a relationship between access to basic services, such as health and 
education, and perceptions of local or national government. Whether services were provided 
by state or non-state actors also did not affect perceptions. However, if services were 
inadequate, this led to a deterioration in the perception of government. These findings have 
clear implications for attempts at TSP and are further complicated in contexts with numerous 
international actors (see Hart 2001). 
Additionally, targeting issues centred around the logistics and choice of targeting means, the 
often-costly repercussions to do so and associated philosophical underpinnings have 
important repercussions. The problem of social policy analysis excluding the broader political 
economy has been highlighted by Mkandawire (2005: 16) who rightly warns of wider 
implications beyond those targeted: ‘social policies not only define the boundaries of social 
communities and the position of individuals in the social order of things, but also affect 
people’s access to material well-being and social status.’ Roelen, Sabates-Wheeler and 
Devereux (2016: 235) take these sentiments a step further by proposing that ‘a more radical 
question worth exploring is whether, and to what extent, social protection programmes 
primarily serve a political function to placate the poor and their demands for justice, rather 
than being a genuinely effective mechanism for redistribution’ which somewhat echoes Sen’s 
(1995: 14) famous argument that ‘benefits meant exclusively for the poor often end up being 
poor benefits.’ 
It is therefore crucial to factor in the political drivers of SP schemes, and in this specific case 
graduation, to assess their true potential for transformation. As Hickey (2009: 481) has 
consistently shown, ‘if reaching the poorest in a sustained way requires a re-drawing of the 
social contract between states and citizens in developing countries, this task is seriously 
complicated by the influential role that international development agencies play in many such 
contexts’. These agencies have famously been depicted as the anti-politics machine 
detached from the subjectivities, identities and positionalities of different actors. In The Anti-
Politics Machine, Ferguson noted that empowerment was the answer to the many 
deprivations suffered across the globe. Yet heeded, however, that calls of ‘ “what is to be 
done?” demand first of all an answer to the question, “by whom?” ’ (Ferguson 1990: 280). 
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2.5 Transformation – micro… detail and empirical 
If a graduation programme’s success rests on its ability to improve outcomes for 
beneficiaries then there is widespread evidence of this. Banerjee et al. (2015) have shown 
statistically significant gains across a variety of indicators for six countries that have adopted 
the graduation model. Meanwhile, the number of Bangladeshi graduates now exceeds half a 
million with numerous evaluations showing positive results, including diversified income 
sources, reduced casual labour and increased consumption (Bandiera et al. 2013; Ahmed et 
al. 2009). Perhaps most importantly, studies have shown that the ‘difference in per-capita 
income between the programme participants and comparison groups… increased[d] at an 
accelerating pace’ over time (Raza, Das and Misha 2012: 265) with the insinuation that 
beneficiaries have effectively used their training and assets to continue an upwards trajectory 
and sustainably graduate. 
Often the benefits of graduation spill beyond the realm of the economic. Evidence from 
Rwanda has shown increased confidence amongst female beneficiaries who attribute their 
success ‘to their acquisition of voice and agency… [and] point out that barriers to leaping 
above the poverty line are not only economic, but rather that social challenges often prevent 
them from maintaining a livelihood’ (McIlvaine et al. 2015: 91). . These findings are seconded 
by Sabates and Abbott (2013) who found significant increases in social inclusion gauged by 
cooperative membership and attendance at church. Further evidence from fieldwork across 
Kenya, Ghana and Lesotho suggests that graduation ‘increased social capital and allowed 
beneficiaries to re-engage with existing social networks and/or to strengthen informal social 
protection systems and risk-sharing arrangements’ (Daidone et al. 2015: 96). 
However, there is also evidence of negative impacts at both the intra-community and intra-
household level. For example, Concern (2015) found incidents of heightened tension 
between those households included and those excluded from their programme in Burundi. 
Whilst targeting techniques in Rwanda have led to the corroding of social relations: ‘before 
people used to support mutually in solidarity; it was solidarity in farming or building 
households; now [new] categories do not at all refer to this solidarity; it is individual work in 
loneliness’ (citizen of Rwezamenyo sector, cited in Sentama 2014: 36; see also Gahamanyi 
and Kettlewell 2015). 
Finally, Sengupta (2012: 38) has highlighted, with reference to Ethiopia, the need for ‘a more 
nuanced understanding of each participant household’s pre-existing resources and 
constraints [to] potentially minimise any incongruity between programme inputs and 
household needs.’ Roelen (2015: 31) proposes integrating childcare solutions into graduation 
programmes as a solution to ‘having to juggle engagement in programme and non-
programme related productive activities and domestic and care work’. 
3 Transformation – macro… conceptual and theorised 
Information on the wider impacts of graduation programmes is a lot less frequent in the 
literature. There are, however, some highly relevant findings from Bangladesh. Hossain 
(2005: 971) has shown that when the power of local elites is dependent ‘not on inherited 
status or massive wealth but on demonstrating the intention and ability to help’, then the 
provision of SP to the ultra-poor may be in the interests of these groups. She goes on to 
argue that for said elites ‘the most dependent poor are a weak but symbolically powerful 
constituency, whose interests to some degree coincide with their own’ (ibid.: 971). 
In Sub-Saharan Africa, high-level political support from the governments of Ethiopia and 
Rwanda is touted as a positive influence on graduation programmes located in these 
countries. Yet, and as Devereux and Ulrichs (2015: 151) have shown ‘with political support 
also comes political pressure to demonstrate success’. Unfortunately, said pressure is cited 
as creating perverse incentives that favour ‘rapid’ or ‘premature’ graduation which, 
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consequently, allows these governments to be seen as implementing a robust and 
successful poverty eradication strategy. 
4 Haiti 
Despite significant reductions in monetary and multidimensional poverty, Haiti remains one of 
the poorest and most unequal countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. With a HDI 
value of 0.493, the country ranks 163rd worldwide with a GDP per capita – which stood at 
US$1,658 (2011 PPP) – significantly lower than the average for countries in the region 
(UNDP 2016). 
The majority of the population who live in rural areas (UN 2016), where extreme poverty is 
almost five times as prevalent as metropolitan Haiti (World Bank 2014), are further 
disadvantaged by the scant provision of public services (ibid.). Access to drinking water and 
‘the presence of pregnant and/or lactating women in the household… [as well as] the 
presence of a woman as a head of the household’ (World Bank 2016: 14) are all important 
factors of vulnerability and deprivation. Taken together, the above has resulted in a deeply 
stratified society (Moncrieffe 2007: 81). 
Large numbers of international donors and NGOs operate in present day Haiti as a 
consequence of the country’s protracted history of colonial rule and imposed structural 
adjustment policies (Schuller 1997), which has been further aggravated by frequent 
environmental and economic shocks. Relatedly, the popular and residual image is one of an 
absent or predatory state (see Dash 2016). Despite this, and as the country continues to 
undergo processes of state-building after recent elections, there are SP schemes emerging 
(see Lamaute-Brisson 2013) which may help to rebalance the overwhelming burden of public 
service provision away from private hands (Zanotti 2010). 
Fonkoze is the largest microfinance institution in the country with its recent Chemen Lavi 
Miyò (CLM) programme, modelled on BRAC’s CFPR-TUP programme, aspiring to reach the 
most deprived female beneficiaries living in rural areas. There are five core elements to the 
programme: (i) targeting the poorest women in certain communities (ii) cash transfer to 
support basic needs, food security and health care for a six-month period (iii) a formal 
savings programme (iv) skills training and (v) transfer of two productive assets to ‘kickstart’ 
sustainable economic activity (Pain, Vautravers and Descieux 2015). Importantly, ‘individuals 
graduate into microfinance, which provides ongoing support, rather than out of a social 
protection programme’ (Huda and Simanowitz 2009: 87), as depicted by Fonkoze’s 
programme chart below (see Figure 4.1). 
It is important to note that case managers continually visit CLM beneficiaries to monitor their 
progress throughout the year and a half graduation programme with Fonkoze ‘attempt[ing] to 
create horizontal social capital… through weekly group meetings’ with local beneficiaries and 
leaders (Huda and Simanowitz 2009: 101). Of note, this first step on the ‘staircase out of 
poverty’ is more costly than other Fonkoze programmes (Werlin 2016: 37) and ‘by far the 
most expensive out of all the ultra-poor graduation models’ (Huda and Simanowitz 2009: 
106). 
As with many of the programmes outlined above, the success of the CLM programme has 
been noted by a number of evaluations with ‘an analysis of poverty scores show[ing] that 
every single CLM member improved their score over’ the 18-month period (Huda and 
Simanowitz 2009: 90), 97 per cent of families graduated from the programme of which three 
quarters moved into the Ti Kredi programme3 (Huda and Simanowitz 2010). 
                                               
3
 Ti Kredi is the microfinance programme into which CLM beneficiaries can opt to graduate into. 
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Figure 4.1 Fonkoze’s ‘Staircase Out of Poverty’ 
 
Source: © Fonkoze, reproduced with kind permission. 
However, there are important distinctions to be made. Evaluations have found that ‘members 
are not all progressing at the same speed’ (Huda and Simanowitz 2009: 104). Pain et al. 
(2015) find mixed results after following up with CLM graduates three years after their cycle 
had ended - roughly 30 per cent had continued an upward trajectory, almost 40 per cent 
stagnated or registered a slight decline and the final 30 per cent recorded significant 
declines. It has been posited that beneficiaries suffer as they transition into Ti Kredi which 
has noticeably less case manager support (Huda and Simanowitz 2010) raising important 
questions about paternalistic practices and the agency of CLM beneficiaries. 
Finally, whilst there is plenty of anecdotal evidence implying increased social cohesion and 
solidarity in programme areas (see Section 4 of Huda and Simanowitz 2010), with powerful 
examples also found in Werlin (2016), there is a greater need for more robust evaluation of 
these dynamics across binaries such as beneficiary/non-beneficiary and targeted/non-
targeted community. 
As iterated earlier, there can be no transformation without affecting the ‘underlying 
generative framework’ (Fraser 1997: 23), in other words without addressing the causes of 
inequality. Despite a long history of structural problems, recent developments in Haiti may 
lead to such changes. Firstly, a recently elected government ‘with a new and urgent 
opportunity to demonstrate a commitment to the social contract. Secondly, a national 
disillusion, and anger, with external interference that creates an element of commonality 
between citizen and state’ (IDS 2015: 28). 
As such, advocacy work for the CLM programme is emerging and recent progress has been 
made in engaging with the variety of institutions that provide forms of SP in Haiti. This is 
further complicated by a long history of limited state capacity with the first National Social 
Protection Strategy only due to be published later this year (Simanowitz 2017). However, 
some authors have noted that Fonkoze is one of few institutions with such an expansive 
geographical reach in Haiti (Tucker and Will 2005; Zanotti 2010) which presents a unique 
opportunity to push for TSP. 
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5 Discussion 
By definition, transformative social protection aspires to achieve more than the traditional 
provision, protection and promotion frameworks. As such, the success of graduation 
programmes in alleviating chronic poverty as outlined above, whilst commendable, and 
indicative of hugely promotive schemes, is not enough for transformation. This is even more 
pertinent given the huge costs of providing such holistic packages to the ultra-poor. 
As much of the literature has shown, transformation is about affecting the ‘underlying 
generative framework’ (Fraser 1997: 23) to ‘integrate individuals equally into society’ 
(Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux (2008: 70). Essentially, TSP sets the bar high. Whilst there 
is evidence of sustained graduation across many of the countries and programmes 
mentioned in this paper, the findings from Haiti drive home the need for nuanced approaches 
to analyses of graduation programmes. Sen (2017: 362) has argued that a variety of 
attributes ‘can make two different people have quite divergent substantive opportunities even 
when they have the same commodity bundle’. If these pathways to graduation remain 
unexplored or unexplained, the accusation of the anti-politics machine reincarnate (Hickey 
2009) will linger. 
There remain further tensions at the micro-level relating back to the debate surrounding 
targeting and universalism outlined by Mkandawire (2005). When reviewing the evidence 
detailed above, it seems that there is often an inherent contradiction between graduation as 
a tool for reaching the ultra-poor and transformation that requires ‘collective action of 
marginalised groups’. This contradiction is that often the tools for targeting the ultra-poor are 
either unclear (as in the case of Rwanda), distinguish between those who perceive 
themselves to be of equal socioeconomic status (as in the case of Burundi) or incited 
jealousy (as in the case of Haiti – see Werlin 2016: 65–68). All of which are ill-conducive to 
the types of social capital formulation that the literature deems necessary for transformation. 
It is therefore pertinent to ask, similarly to that posed by Ferguson (1990: 229), 
transformation for who and transformation by whom? If Carroll (2011) has proposed a 
framing of social transfers as a transfer of power, then the findings presented above present 
a complicated picture. Whilst there seems to be elite support for the ultra-poor in 
Bangladesh, there appears to be little agency for the ultra-poor in and of themselves. Their 
ability to ‘make a difference’ (Giddens 1964) is clearly constrained and if we think back to the 
question posited by Roelen et al. (2016) then the answer, at least in this instance, does not 
bode well for graduation as transformation. 
There are further problems for transformation across the macro scale of analysis. Key 
stakeholder perceptions of graduation in Ethiopia and Rwanda have been shown to promote 
the political over the empirical (Devereux and Ulrichs 2015). When this prioritisation does 
occur, it can be detrimental to the ability of beneficiaries to graduate as those who benefit 
from the ‘underlying generative framework’ (Fraser 1997: 23) can continue to exert their 
power over others (Arendt 1970) and reinforce the status quo. The case of Haiti does 
however offer some promise in this regard. As the country continues along a path of state-
building, Fonkoze and the CLM programme have an opportunity to engage with and 
formulate a framework that can offer transformation. 
Finally, when looking across the numerous graduation programmes presented above, it is 
perhaps premature to conclude that the multiple conditions for transformation have not been 
met yet. What is above all needed are more ambitious evaluation methodologies that can 
match the ambition of the TSP agenda. The alternative evaluation framework proposed by 
Devereux et al. 2013: 7) , which incorporates ‘programme policies, social dynamics and 
feedback loops… [and] acknowledges the importance of politics’, may be an important step 
in the right direction. Combined with the multi-level approach advocated by Kabeer (1999) in  
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reference to female empowerment, these knowledge gaps regarding the potential 
transformative-ness of graduation programmes may be closed and more definitive answers 
be given. 
6 Conclusion 
The evidence compiled in the above has shown undoubtedly that graduation programmes 
are consistently improving the lives of the ultra-poor across various settings. Yet, whilst this 
is indicative of a social protection that is largely promotive, it is not evidence of 
transformation as outlined by the Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux (2008) framework. 
The main takeaway from this paper is that evaluations are conducted in a way that rarely 
enables a distinctive qualification of the transformative-ness of a specific programme. This is 
evident in the relative dearth of evidence available that assesses the ‘macro’ impacts of 
graduation programmes. The evidence that is available, from Ethiopia, Rwanda and 
Bangladesh, whilst far from conclusive, hints at social protection agendas that are 
reminiscent of Ferguson’s (1990) binary of transformation by somebody for somebody else. 
Which, as we have seen, goes against many of the conceptual underpinnings of power, 
empowerment and, consequently, transformation. 
Whilst the example of Haiti, which is still in the nascent stages of developing an ‘underlying 
generative framework’ (Fraser 1997: 23), does offer more hope of promoting and engraining 
TSP on the national stage, the message remains the same. Without evaluation strategies 
that can simultaneously look beyond the micro impacts of graduation programmes, be this 
intra-community negating the dynamic between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, inter-
community ignoring wider networks of social capital or more broader patterns of socio-
political inequality, then TSP will remain an abstract concept. 
Fortunately, there are frameworks, either that proposed by Devereux et al. (2013) or Kabeer 
(1999), that can enable TSP not only to be operationalised more fluidly, but to also be 
properly evaluated. I believe that is only through these approaches can we fully understand 
the transformative nature of graduation programmes, and development programmes more 
widely, which in turn is key if we are to achieve SDG 1 and the targets set beyond that. 
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The Implications of Industry 4.0 on the 
Competitiveness of Developing Countries 
Samuel Leistner 
1 Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to assess the implications of recent technological innovations on 
the competitiveness of developing countries, mainly in the manufacturing sector. The last 
years are characterised by rapid and disruptive technological innovations in several fields, 
which together amount to what is being termed as the ‘Fourth Industrial Revolution’. Even if 
these developments are only an acceleration of the Information and Communication 
Technology (ICT) developments that happened in the previous decades, the increasing 
connection of the physical and digital layers of our world, advanced robotics and automation, 
artificial intelligence or 3D printing could change the future trajectories of many countries’ 
economies. 
Innovation always poses substantial challenges for both developing and developed countries 
and these new technologies might lead to exactly that kind of creative destruction which 
Schumpeter described for periods of technological and societal change. This change does 
not only affect developed countries but could be highly devastating for developing countries 
which often have their comparative advantages linked with cheap low-skilled labour. 
This paper first provides a general framework of technological change. Thereafter it analyses 
the impact, potential, and the necessary interventions coming with ‘Industry 4.0’. This 
happens by analysing selected Industry 4.0 elements regarding their implications, in 
particular for developing countries. To assess possible policy approaches to deal with 
Industry 4.0 the BRICS common strategy and the manufacturing policies of China and India 
will be analysed. This helps to identify the gaps between existing policies and the 
interventions required for a technological convergence. The focus is hereby more on 
emerging rather than least-developed countries (LDCs), because Industry 4.0 is based on 
digital infrastructure which is much more available in emerging countries than in LDCs. 
Chapter 2 will introduce the general implications of technological change, chapter 3 and 4 will 
describe Industry 4.0 and the barriers to a successful technology diffusion of it. Finally, 
Chapter 5 will look at the implications of skill development in the context of Industry 4.0. 
2 Coping with technological change: policy implications? 
For many developing countries, which have their comparative advantages based on cheap 
low-skilled labour, the priority is to adopt and adapt already existing technology to narrow the 
technological gap to developed countries. Nevertheless, for many developed countries the 
creation and improvement of technology is important to stay competitive in markets. This 
follows the assumption that technology and innovation has an endogenous growth potential 
and that there is technological competition within and between countries with technological 
advancement driven by research and development or by the continuous improvement of 
technology while using it, the so called learning by doing effect (Arrow 1971; Romer 1990). 
Therefore, it is important to distinguish between technological policies which focus on the 
promotion of vertical integration by promoting incentives that foster innovation, and policies 
which focus on the acquisition of technology. 
2.1 The innovation based approach 
Policies which aim to create a national system of innovation have proven themselves as 
potential drivers of growth. A prominent example is the experience of Japan (Freeman 1989). 
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The main risk of technological change however is its skill-bias and the implications for global 
and national inequality (Acemoglu 1998). The comparative advantage which high-skilled 
workers have declines with the age of the technology and therefore peaks at the 
implementation and adjustment of new technologies. This implies that policies which focus 
on increasing the skill level of the workforce potentially increase the speed of technological 
diffusion (Bartel and Lichtenberg 1987). 
However, the implications of innovation for low-skilled labour can be devastating without 
government interventions. Thus, an industrial policy aimed to smooth out the transition from 
obsolete to innovative technology, needs to address two aspects. First it needs to gradually 
upgrade the skill set of the workforce to favour the transition towards advanced technology. 
But at the same time it cannot simply abandon the support of the old industry to avoid that 
the old industry comes down with a crash (Schumpeter 1994). 
2.2 Absorbing innovation: the management of technology diffusion 
One measurement of the future significance of a technology is the pace in which it can 
diffuse through markets and becomes omnipresent. Main constraints of technological 
diffusion are for developed countries mainly on the demand side. Sectors such as 
government services, health and education are only slowly increasing their demand for new 
technologies (Rodrik 2016a). 
Many developing and emerging countries mainly rely on technology diffusion. However, the 
process of transferring technologies depends a lot on the absorptive capacities of the 
receiving country (Cohen and Levinthal 1990). Developing countries face here a lot of 
problems on the supply side. The main slowdown is the lack of high-skilled workers. The 
transition from agriculture to manufacturing can easily transform agricultural workers to low-
skilled manufacturing workers. However, the current technological changes lead to 
widespread automation in all sectors. This makes a transition of unskilled workers impossible 
since there will be a lack of occupations with an adequate skill level. This human capital 
deficiency threatens to erase the comparative advantage of many developing countries 
(Rodrik 2016a). A main factor in improving absorptive capacities, dealing with automation 
and the supply side in general is therefore the upgrading of human capital. 
3 What is industry 4.0? 
3.1 Emergence and evolution of the term 4.0 
The term Industry 4.0 came firstly up at the Hannover Trade Fair in 2011 as the name of a 
future initiative for the German government. The original concept aimed at the development 
of intelligent surveillance and decision-making processes to control value chain networks in 
real time. The way to achieve this is embedded systems. These are products with intelligent 
sensors which act as observers and actors in their own production process. This concept is 
also known as the Internet of Things (IoT). Furthermore, Industry 4.0 introduces the notion of 
an Internet of Services, where new smart products can exchange their services with other 
products by machine-to-machine communication (M2M) (Kopetz 2011; Kagermann, Lukas 
and Wahlster 2011). It is important to highlight that the use of the term Industry 4.0 became 
much broader, from an initial focus on embedded systems to a synonym of a fourth industrial 
revolution (Schwab 2016). 
While the term Industry 4.0 was not common outside the German speaking area in the years 
after it was established (Lasi et al. 2014) this has recently changed. Globally, industry 
consulting companies started adapting the term to describe global value chain changes. The 
BRICS Business Council released the whitepaper Skill Development for Industry 4.0 in 2017 
(BRICS Skill Development Working Group 2017). This shows the emergence of the term as 
a framework for developing countries. Moreover, the United Nations Industrial Development 
Organization (UNIDO) addressed the opportunities and challenges of Industry 4.0 for 
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emerging and developing countries, highlighting the possible impact for developing countries 
and identified Industry 4.0 as one of the major drivers of a fourth industrial revolution (UNIDO 
2016). The unsophisticated-ness of Industry 4.0 and the fact that it is not accompanied by 
unwanted political connotations seems to recommend it as a framework for countries all over 
the world. Therefore, this paper will use this framework for analysis. 
Table 3.1 Industry 4.0 characteristics and technologies 
Company Key aspects Key technologies 
Price 
Waterhouse 
Coopers 
1. Digitisation and integration of 
vertical and horizontal value chains 
2. Digitisation of product and service 
offerings 
3. Digital business models and 
customer access 
Cloud computing, mobile devices, IoT 
platforms, location detection 
technologies, advanced human-
machine interfaces, authentication and 
fraud detection, 3D printing, smart 
sensors, big data analytics and 
advanced algorithms, multilevel 
customer interaction and customer 
profiling, augmented reality/wearables 
Deloitte 1. Vertical networking 
2. Horizontal integration 
3. Through-engineering 
4. Acceleration through exponential 
technologies 
5. Environment of the IoT: Internet of 
data, internet of services (IoS), and 
internet of people 
Exponential technologies such as IoT, 
artificial intelligence, intelligent robots, 
autonomous drones, 3D printing, and 
sensors 
McKinsey Digitisation of the manufacturing 
sector, with embedded sensors, 
ubiquitous cyber physical systems, 
and analysis of all relevant data. 
Driven by: 
1. data, computational power, and 
connectivity 
2. analytics and intelligence 
3. human-machine interaction 
4. digital-to-physical conversion (e.g. 
advanced robotics/3D printing) 
Big data/open data, IoT, cloud 
technology, digitisation and automation 
of knowledge work, advanced analytics, 
touch interfaces and next level GUIs, 
virtual and augmented reality, 3D 
printing, advanced robotics, energy 
storage and harvesting 
BRICS 
Business 
Council 
Seamless connection of the real and 
virtual world - reduces labour cost 
advantages of traditional low-cost 
locations 
Automation/robotics, IoT, artificial 
intelligence, 3D printing 
Source: Deloitte 2014; PricewaterhouseCoopers 2016; UNIDO 2016; BRICS Skill Development Working Group 2017; McKinsey 
& Company 2015. 
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3.2 Scope and technologies 
A pivotal aggregation of all innovations is the so-called ‘smart factory’, which can assist both 
people and machines in their task execution by having the ability of context-awareness 
(Mitsuishi, Ueda and Kimura 2008). The European Union defines the main features of 
Industry 4.0 as interoperability, virtualisation, decentralisation, real time capability, service 
orientation, and modularity (Smit et al. 2016). Considering the lack of academic literature on 
this topic, it is helpful to assess the actual scope of Industry 4.0 by looking at the 
understanding of the concept by different actors in the industry. Table 3.1 gives a 
comprehensive overview of the used technologies. 
3.3 General implications 
The complexity and scale of the technological and societal changes triggered by Industry 4.0 
makes quantified forecasting difficult. Existing forecasts usually differ in their scope. General 
Electric forecasted in 2012 that about 46 per cent of the global economy can profit from an 
Industrial Internet, a term which has a similar scope as Industry 4.0, which quantifies to US$ 
32.3 trillion (Annunziata and Evans 2012). There are detailed forecasts for the impact of 
Industry 4.0 by the Boston Consulting Group on Germany with an estimated annual revenue 
growth of around EUR€ 30 billion (around one percent of the German GDP). In terms of 
employment, a growth of 6 per cent is predicted for the next ten years. This positive outlook 
is related to the composition of the German labour force with its large share of high-skilled 
workers (Rüßmann et al. 2015). Accenture estimated the value of an Industrial Internet for 
several countries until 2030 in terms of cumulative GDP added value. The estimations are up 
to US$7,146 billion for the US, US$531 billion for the UK, US$700 for Germany, and US$ 
1,824 billion for China (Purdy and Davarzani 2015). 
4 The challenges of a global implementation of industry 4.0 
4.1 Leapfrogging 
Innovation sometimes allows a country to go beyond mere technology diffusion and skip a 
technological stage, the so called leapfrogging process. An example is moving from no 
landline telecommunication directly to mobile phones: strategies based on wireless 
communication technology, which skip the use of expensive network grid infrastructure, can 
have a strong impact on economic development and could increase the participation of the 
poor parts of the population in ICT (Alzouma 2005; Fong 2009). However, leapfrogging 
requires that the technology’s maturity has reached a level where not only the technology 
itself but also the skills to use it are acquirable in the new context (Perez and Soete 1988). 
Developing countries frequently lack the absorptive capacity which is needed to utilise 
leapfrogging opportunities. Companies and governments need to be able to spot these 
opportunities, but too much focus might be risky due to the uncertainty associated with 
potential leapfrogging processes (Cohen and Levinthal 1990; Steinmueller 2001). 
Furthermore, the digital divide within developing countries could be intensified by 
leapfrogging without access to it for all parts of the population. UNIDO puts a special 
emphasis on innovation management standards and general Industry 4.0 standards which 
would ease technology diffusion (UNIDO 2016). 
The World Economic Forum (WEF) sees the leapfrogging potential into Industry 4.0 mainly 
for developed and emerging rather than for developing economies since leapfrogging needs 
vast investments in digital infrastructure. The large investments into infrastructure of many 
emerging countries allow them to add the newest technology in constructions. Developing 
countries which face a lack of finance will have to rely on retrofitting in the future (World 
Economic Forum 2015). 
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4.2 Premature deindustrialisation 
A problem regarding the development of a manufacturing sector which can adapt Industry 
4.0 technologies is that open economies which are not already at their peak of 
industrialisation are importing the deindustrialisation of highly industrialised countries due to 
the fall in global price levels in manufacturing, caused by higher productivities. This 
premature deindustrialisation further weakens the manufacturing sector, which was one of 
the main drivers for development in the past, of developing countries (Rodrik 2016b). A 
possible solution could be to combine cheap acquisition of knowledge with cheap labour and 
to specialise in things such as cultural production, educational production and computer 
programming for export-orientated growth. An example is India which also grew strongly due 
to the export of non-physical goods such as information technology and services (Cowen 
2016). 
4.3 Limited internet access 
Figure 4.1 Internet participation 
 
Source: Author’s creation based on data from International Telecommunication Union (2016). 
Figure 4.2 4Mbps broad speed globally 
 
Source: Akamai (2016). (c) 1999-2013 Akamai Technologies Inc. All rights reserved. Reproduced with permission. 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016*
Developed 50.9 53.5 59.0 61.3 62.9 66.5 67.7 72.0 73.8 76.1 78.1 81.0
Developing 7.8 9.4 11.9 14.6 17.4 21.0 23.9 26.8 29.4 33.1 36.7 40.1
0
20
40
60
80
100
Share of Individuals using the Internet
 © 2018 The Author © Institute of Development Studies 35 
As Figure 4.1 plots, both developed countries and developing countries could increase 
internet participation by more than 30 per cent but the gap between them remained at around 
40 per cent. While developing countries quintuplicated internet participation since 2005 the 
main constraint for any activities related to Industry 4.0 remains their lack of fast broadband. 
In many countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, under 10 per cent of connections reach speeds 
over 4MBps. This limits activities which rely on big data, compromising competitiveness in 
global digitalised value chains. While the impact of slow connectivity on technologies like 3D 
printing might be not as high as for others, it prevents live-monitoring activities related to the 
IoT or IoS. 
The general impact of broadband and ICT for economic growth is inconclusive (Minges 2015; 
Hernandez et al. 2016) but there is a huge negative impact on the Industry 4.0 diffusion to 
developing countries. When one looks at the other end of the spectrum, General Electric is 
working on 100 Gbps fibre-optic network lines for a seamless connection of smart factories 
(GE Global Research 2015). The US already updated their broadband definition to a 
minimum of a 25MBps download and a 3MBps upload speed in 2015 (Federal 
Communications Commission 2015) and it seems to remain utopian for developing countries, 
with average download speeds in many developing countries below 2MBps, to catch up to 
developed countries without huge investments into their digital infrastructure. 
4.4 Lack of human capital 
A main problem for LDCs in benefitting from an Industry 4.0 technology diffusion is their lack 
of human capital. A low level of human capital does not only hinder technology diffusion 
(Nelson and Phelps 1966; Benhabib and Spiegel 2005) but is also connected to low inflows 
of foreign direct investment (Noorbakhsh, Paloni and Youssef 2001). Figure 4.3 shows the 
labour share for 2000, 2016, and the projection for 2021 by formal occupation and country 
group. The intermediate skill level represents jobs which are on a similar level as machine 
operators and assemblers in the manufacturing sector. Managers, professionals, technicians 
and associated professionals are in the high-skilled group. The low-skilled group only 
represents elementary occupations. 
Figure 4.3 Employment composition by country group 
 
Source: Author’s creation based on data from International Labour Organization (2016). 
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Figure 4.3 clearly plots the huge difference between the skill composition of low income (LIC) 
and high income countries (HIC). The share of high-skill labour in high income countries was 
in 2016 nearly 35 per cent higher than in low income countries. Moreover, all country groups 
beside LIC experienced a shift away from intermediate-skilled occupations towards high-
skilled occupations, while LICs increased the proportion of elementary occupations. 
Division by occupation helps to estimate the preparedness of LICs for Industry 4.0 
technology diffusion. Immature technology requires skills which are mainly developed in a 
learning by doing framework. The potential for an increase in productivity by the mere 
knowledge of a technology is limited when there is no playing field where it can be adapted. 
This requires a high labour share in high-skilled occupations which improves the absorptive 
capacity of the sector (Arrow 1971; Perez and Soete 1988; Lucas 1988). Nevertheless, much 
of the lack of increase in the high-skill occupations in LICs can be related to stagnating 
education levels and the outlook for developing countries does not seem too positive. 
Estimations of the McKinsey Institute predict a lack of jobs for 15 per cent of people with 
secondary education and that a creation of 380 million additional non-farm jobs would be 
needed until 2020 to match the growing labour demand in developing countries (Dobbs et al. 
2012). 
4.5 Automation 
Frey and Osborne (2017) ranked over 700 occupations according to their risk of getting 
replaced by a computer. Not only sectors such as logistics and manufacturing are at risk but 
also a substantial share of the service sector. A strong negative relationship exists between 
skill levels and the probability of computerisation. Jobs with a low-risk of computerisation 
usually require higher skill levels and share the common attributes of creative and social 
intelligence. Governments face the challenge to support their citizens in acquiring these skills 
or providing them with another way of securing their subsistence. Moreover, since work is 
widely regarded as a driver of meaningfulness, governments and societies will need to come 
up with solutions to fill this gap. Filling the new leisure time might be a huge driver of job 
creation itself. 
Robotisation impacts employment in manufacturing mostly in the automotive, electronics, 
metal, and chemical product sectors. The global industrial robot stock had an average annual 
growth rate of 19 per cent between 2010 and 2015 and the main future growth is expected to 
happen in Asia (International Federation of Robotics 2016) but robotisation does not create 
enough fiscal resources to make the social transition of workers which lose their jobs. Robots 
are also likely to make premature deindustrialisation more severe, by weakening the 
comparative advantage of cheap labour in developing countries. It is unlikely that developing 
countries can attract the investments needed for competitive industries. Even in countries 
with strong vertical integration additional provision of robots is likely to benefit only high 
skilled activities (Rodrik 2016b; UNCTAD 2016). 
LDCs could benefit from transportation robots, mainly from unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) 
commonly known as drones. While the likelihood for a shift towards drone transportation to 
consumers is generally limited by many constraints, causing a limited profitability compared 
to traditional logistics (Mckinnon 2016), the bad infrastructure of many LDCs would give air-
transport higher revenues due to the high costs for land transport. This can already be seen 
by the advantages of drones in the delivery of vaccines over traditional methods (Haidari et 
al. 2016). Similar to the use of drones are airships which not only could help to reach more 
consumers due to their high transportation capacity, but could also work as relays for mobile 
broadband (Ramalingam et al. 2016). 
4.6 3D printing 
3D printing can, similar to automation, increase the proximity of the producer to the market 
by lowering transport costs. However, the impact on employment is likely to be negative due 
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to less demand for low-skilled labour. Global direct economic impact by 3D printing is 
estimated to be US$230 billion to US$550 billion per year in 2025 (Manyika et al. 2013). 3D 
printing could also damage emerging countries such as Mexico, which made the shift from 
the sole production of parts to the creation of a finished product in the automotive sector. The 
advantages of vertical integration in manufacturing with complete production in all stages 
would be mitigated by local production in developed countries and the countries with the 
biggest consumer markets. It is therefore likely that countries which gain a regional 
comparative advantage in 3D printing will strongly benefit from it, as they can supply regional 
markets. On the other hand, countries relying on far distance exports would suffer from it. 
Thus countries with a high population and large consumer markets such as China, India, and 
the US could benefit the most from local production since they reach a huge market without 
crossing borders. 
5 How can emerging countries adjust to Industry 4.0: the BRICS skill 
development strategy 
The aim of this chapter is to analyse the common BRICS skill development Industry 4.0 
policy to show ways for emerging countries to adapt to the challenges of Industry 4.0. 
Furthermore, the manufacturing strategies of China and India are introduced to show what 
and how much emerging countries can do to increase readiness for Industry 4.0. 
5.1 Upgrading human capital: skill development for Industry 4.0 
New technologies rely on high-skilled labour. As shown before, human capital is one of the 
main constraints of developing countries to further advance in technology-intense sectors. 
However, the upgrading of human capital matters also for developed countries. Table 5.1 
gives here some contrast showing the policy focus of some developed countries. 
Nevertheless, as seen before, the low share of workers in lower and middle-income countries 
makes adapting to Industry 4.0 much more complicated since they cannot draw on the 
transition of existing high skilled labour to new technologies. 
Table 5.1 Industry 4.0 policy frameworks of developed countries 
Country Strategy Key focus 
USA Advanced manufacturing 
partnership 2.0/industrial 
internet consortium 
Bringing industry, academia and government 
together to promote an industrial internet 
Germany High Tech Strategy 2020 Becoming world leader in embedded (cyber-
physical) systems, ICT-research 
France Industrie du Futur Develop new technological solutions, support 
companies in the transformation, train employees, 
strengthen cooperation for international standards 
Japan Industrial Value Chain 
Initiative 
To build a mutually connected system architecture 
with collaboration areas between companies 
Source: White House (2013); Germany Trade and Invest (2014); The Industrial Value Chain Initiative (n.d.). 
A possible approach to tackle the challenges of Industry 4.0 is the skill development path, the 
common BRICS strategy for Industry 4.0. The following paragraphs draw mainly on the 
findings of the BRICS whitepaper on skill development (BRICS Skill Development Working 
Group 2017). 
5.1.1 Initial conditions of the manufacturing sector 
Major parts of the BRICS rely on manufacturing, and especially for China and India, high 
tech exports gain significance. The BRICS Council sees therefore the need to adopt Industry 
 © 2018 The Author © Institute of Development Studies 38 
4.0 to maintain competitiveness. All BRICS states beside China have a low Industry 4.0 
readiness measured by the levels of industrial automation, Industry 4.0-related patent 
applications, numbers of machine-to-machine connections, and the activities in robotics and 
3D printing. The whitepaper suggests that most of the BRICS countries will need 
leapfrogging to a higher level of industrial automation to adapt Industry 4.0. 
5.1.2 Problems regarding human capital 
The need for skill development is based on the weakness in skilled labour in the BRICS. A 
strong negative effect of a future adoption of Industry 4.0 on lower-skilled jobs is anticipated. 
This comes in addition to the high unemployment following population growth. The BRICS 
generally have a weak skill composition. This relates to the weakness of tertiary education 
and vocational training. The council identifies skill development as a main challenge of 
Industry 4.0 for the BRICS. However, there are some principal problems. First, there is a lack 
of training institutes and vocational schools. This hinders education outside of universities. 
Moreover, vocational training is classroom based and does not include practical experience. 
It also has a bad reputation. Dual systems such as the German one would be much more 
beneficial for combining on the job training with education. Furthermore, the general quality 
in education both of staff and infrastructure, and also of the curriculum, is poor. This is 
among other reasons caused by the lack of funding for education. 
5.1.3 Measures for skill development 
To reach competitive skill development for Industry 4.0, the most significant measures can 
be summarised by two main pillars. The first one deals with the assessment of future skill 
demand and opportunities of skill transfer. The second includes infrastructure, vocational 
training and curriculum related measures. 
The strategy sees as the first step for a successful skill development the assessment of the 
future skill demand of an Industry 4.0 adoption. This is necessary to make the required 
changes to national curricula to meet future demands for Industry 4.0 by the manufacturing 
sector. Furthermore, joining international institutions such as the European Training 
Foundation (ETF) can help to draw on the best available expertise for skill development 
related to Industry 4.0. Moreover, an education framework following the idea of the European 
Qualification Framework (EQF) could help to increase labour mobility among the BRICS 
countries since every country would accept the degree qualifications of the others. Industry 
4.0 skills could hereby be included in the framework. 
To provide high quality training in Industry 4.0 related skills it is important to involve the 
private sector to guarantee that the taught skills match the industry demand. Furthermore, 
providers of Industry 4.0 technology should be involved in the curricula creation. As 
mentioned before there is a lack of exposure to practical work and the involvement of the 
industry can hereby help by offering dual training or apprenticeships. However, in general it 
is important that the education remains holistic since Industry 4.0 requires a broad skillset. A 
lot of the weakness of the BRICS in education and skills is related to the lack of funding for 
building skill development institutes which provide vocational training. Funding across 
countries in example by the New Development Bank (BRICS Bank) could help to improve 
this (BRICS Skill Development Working Group 2017). 
5.2 Increasing industry 4.0 readiness: make in India and made in China 2025 policies 
Both China and India have major industrial policies for improving their manufacturing sector. 
The first smart factory opened in 2016 in India (Kumar 2016) however smart factories or 
Industry 4.0 technologies are not specifically mentioned in India’s ‘Make in India’ policy. It 
aims generally on improving their manufacturing sector by increasing FDI. India has already 
a good track record for the time after its liberalisation in benefitting from technology spillover 
through the FDI channel (Basant and Fikkert 1996; Kathuria 2000) and its vast experience in 
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the attraction of FDI together with investments in digital infrastructure could lead to 
trajectories similar to the evolution of India’s IT based service sector. However, automation 
and increased productivity decreases the advantage of cheap labour and if the trend to 
outsourcing slows down with the trend of global deindustrialisation the FDI attracting path 
might not be sufficient. India however could also utilise their strong ICT sector to promote 
innovation in the manufacturing sector to stay competitive. 
On the other hand, China’s holistic industrial policy ‘Made in China 2025’ is directly inspired 
by the Industry 4.0 concept but also covers quality control, output consistency and 
environmental issues (China-Britain Business Council 2016). Together with the Belt and 
Road initiative it creates China’s future plan for upgrading manufacturing and the export 
market. China also drafted a specific policy for the role of the internet in the manufacturing 
sector called ‘Internet Plus’. Measures which can be directly linked to an improvement of 
China’s Industry 4.0 readiness are hereby an active promotion of internet technology and 
infrastructure. Furthermore, China wants to set industrial standards for the integration of 
internet into industries. To gain a competitive advantage the plan includes innovation 
promotion connected with further protection of intellectual property. This would ideally 
happen in innovation zones such as Zhongguancun, a Chinese version of Silicon Valley. 
There are also plans for a big data strategy. The educational training for ICT, and the better 
use of local and foreign talent is seen as essential for China’s future competitiveness. To 
achieve all of this the government wants to provide financial support and attract foreign and 
local investors (Xinhua 2015). 
6 Conclusion 
The aim of this paper was to assess the implications of Industry 4.0 for developing countries. 
The analysis shows that while Industry 4.0 has a great potential for global economic growth, 
low-skilled manufacturing based countries are facing a huge risk since they lack the skills 
which are required for new technology. The situation for LDCs remains mostly unpredictable, 
mainly dependent on the compatibility of their comparative advantages with cutting-edge 
technology, and would require broad digital infrastructure investments. Moreover, many jobs 
are likely to be replaced through automation and the decrease in outsourcing. Therefore, a 
comparative advantage in labour intense manufacturing could be lost. The risk is hereby 
much higher for those countries in the catch-up process and they require fundamental 
decisions and pro-active industrial policies before they miss the opportunities which come 
with innovation. 
Emerging countries, on the other hand, with their larger share of skilled labour and more 
infrastructure, need to specifically focus on improving their Industry 4.0 readiness. The cases 
of the BRICS, India and China have shown that there is an awareness of the possible 
consequences, if measures such as improvements in human capital and higher investments 
in digital infrastructure and innovation are not undertaken. Especially transnational 
cooperation and the involvement of institutions such as the New Development Bank, the 
World Bank, or Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank could help to make the necessary 
investments in developing countries to not fall behind further. 
To conclude it can be said that Industry 4.0 first benefits developed countries, however 
emerging countries could, with the correct strategies, stay competitive. Especially China with 
its already strong manufacturing sector has a positive outlook. The only sector which might 
provide some benefits for LDCs could be 3D printing since it allows local production and a 
simplification of logistic chains. The huge population of many developing countries gives 
them quite a large consumer market which can be supplied without international competition, 
due to the low transportation costs of a local production with 3D printing. Another possible 
advantage outside of an industrial perspective, which was not mentioned earlier, is that 
Industry 4.0 technologies could have many applications in development assistance 
(Ramalingam et al. 2016). 
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Using Relevant Concepts and 
Framework(s), Analyse a Case of Citizen–
State Engagement and Assess its Strengths, 
Weaknesses and Degree of Success 
Aisha Modibo 
The Aba Women’s Riot against taxes was not a riot and it did not only involve women from 
Aba, but it was spread over most of south-eastern Nigeria (Falola and Aderinto 2010; Van 
Allen 1975). Traditional Igbo women called these demonstrations Ogu Umu Nwanyi which 
translates to ‘making war’ (ibid.). This essay will refer to Ogu Umu Nwanyi as the Women’s 
War of 1929 and the women’s other protests as ‘sitting on a man’. A power analysis will be 
done by reviewing the historical background while exploring the power dynamics between 
the key players and pointing out the strengths and weaknesses of the movement. This essay 
argues that though ‘sitting on men’ had been effective in the past, ‘making war’ ultimately 
proved to be an inappropriate method for achieving long-term change with the British 
colonialists. 
Power is widely understood as being a negative, overt and one-dimensional expression of 
dominance (IPAT 2015; McGee 2016). This is oftentimes accurate, but there several other 
natures, levels, forms and spaces in which power exists simultaneously. These levels (local, 
national and global); forms (visible, invisible and hidden); and spaces (closed, invited and 
created) are represented in the Power Cube and the natures (power over, power to, power 
with and power within) are implied (Gaventa 2006). A dominant person may have power 
‘over’ a subordinate and any actor may have power ‘to’ take action ‘with’ or without a group 
and the awareness ‘within’ that they have the capacity to act (IPAT 2015). The Power Cube 
tells us that power is complex, fluid and can be observed in all relationships within a culture 
or a society. 
In Eurocentric societies, visible power is observable in formal structures where decisions are 
made in closed spaces which are exclusive (IPAT 2015). This was not the case in pre-
colonial Igboland. The Igbo political structures were democratic, meritocratic and power was 
distributed (Afigbo 1966). Despite the patrilineal nature of their traditions which made women 
second-class citizens, village meetings were invited spaces in which women could participate 
in matters that concerned them and decisions were consensus-driven (Van Allen 1975). 
Women were not equal to men, but the power distance was not so large that women were 
unable to confront unacceptable behaviour of men (Wipper 1985). It is perhaps for this 
reason that the women deemed it conceivable to challenge the British. The colonial masters 
exercised their power ‘over’ the indigenous people to undermine their traditional institutions 
and adapt their laws to British tastes, putting only the men in administrative and decision-
making positions (ibid.). They selected one representative from each village to serve as 
warrant chiefs in the Native Administration (ibid.) in a manner that did not reflect the 
democratic and meritocratic nature of the former village meetings. This led to the introduction 
of gender hierarchies and the decline in women’s participation (Falola and Aderinto 2010). 
The British were in charge, the Igbo men became second-class and the Igbo women were 
neglected. Colonialists claimed to be civilising and democratising the ‘savages’ but instead 
they perpetuated hierarchies and the exclusion of women. 
When people are alienated from participation, they tend to create their own spaces based on 
shared identities and/or issues (Gaventa 2006) that empower them ‘to’ engage politically 
(Cornwall 2004). For traditional Igbo women, this took the form of everyday mitiri (meetings 
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in markets) that pre-existed colonisation (Van Allen 1975) and consisted of their 
comprehensive social networks (ibid.) It was in these meetings that they discussed their 
problems and organised ‘with’ each other ‘to’ solve them (ibid.). Whenever they decided that 
a villager’s behaviour was impermissible, they followed a protocol, which consisted of alerting 
him of his wrong behaviour and if he refused to stop, they would then ‘sit on him’ (Wipper 
1985). To ‘sit on’ a man was to arrange a demonstration at his residence to embarrass him 
publicly with detailed songs until such a time when he agreed to discontinue his behaviour 
and repent (Van Allen 1975). Judging by their responses to them, the men seemed to think 
these ‘sit ons’ were a legitimate course of action. The women applied these ‘sit ons’ ‘to’ 
empower themselves collectively and impact their lives in ways that reflected decisions they 
made together. 
The previous accomplishments of ‘sitting on men’ explains why Igbo women had power 
‘within’ when resisting colonial power. In November 1929, thousands of Igbo and Ibibio 
women swiftly coordinated themselves and gathered in front of the Native Administration to 
protest a rumoured introduction of taxes on women (Afigbo 1966; Falola and Aderinto 2010). 
The women adapted the mechanism of collective action which was available to them to make 
clear demands. One officer of the Native Administration appeared to have begun the process 
of tax collection seemingly on his own initiative so they ‘made war’ on him (Van Allen 1975; 
Wipper 1985). The scope of this essay is the political, rather than the economic motives for 
the war. The women felt that their interests were jeopardised and so their economic 
predicament turned their political frustration into resistance against power. This protest was 
successful; the women were assured that they would not be taxed and the officer in question 
was sentenced to jail (ibid.). The demonstration was an exercise of their hidden power in 
confrontation of the administration’s visible power. Hidden power comes into play when 
members of the civil society work to set an agenda (Gaventa 2006; IPAT 2015). One 
common way that activists use this power is by creating spaces such as social movements 
which serve as an expression of resistance and aim for transformation (ibid.). Subsequent 
events will demonstrate that the women’s sole focus on visible power was a weakness in 
their war. 
The Women’s War was more like a social movement than a riot but definitions of social 
movements are ambiguous. Charles Tilly is a prominent scholar of social movements. Tilly 
has been criticised for not prioritising people’s ideologies in his theories (Goldstone 2010). 
He himself recognised that problems may arise when trying to apply his definition to real-life 
contexts (Tilly 1979). In his work, he insists that for a collective action to be regarded as a 
social movement, it needs to be sustained over a long period (ibid.; Tilly 2005). The 
Women’s War of 1929 only lasted for one month although there were a few sporadic 
demonstrations that occurred in 1930 (Wipper 1985). It is unclear whether this constitutes a 
long period, though in more recent history, the Colour Revolutions have been regarded as 
socio-political movements despite most of them only lasting a few months (Gerlach 2014; 
Thein 2009). Another possible issue is with the rationale behind the Women’s War. Between 
1682 and 1691, the women of Narbonne, France protested their tax system and managed to 
get the authorities to reconsider but Tilly argued that their claims were not broad enough for 
their resistance to constitute a social movement (Tilly 1979). However, this essay contends 
that taxes were not the sole reason the women protested in 1929. This essay considers the 
Women’s War as a social movement. 
Their initial victory made them ambitious; some women started regional protests demanding 
the colonialists consult women in political processes or leave (Van Allen 1975; Wipper 1985). 
After a British officer hit two women with his car and left them for dead, the war turned violent 
(Zukas 2008). The women vandalised public property and broke into prisons to release 
prisoners so in response, the British sent soldiers and police to shoot them, vandalise their 
homes and enforce fines (ibid.). Unruly politics exist in spaces of power and they expose 
power relations (Khanna 2012). This climate showed a terrorising abuse of power by the 
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British. It could be argued that it was unrealistic of the women to expect the British to leave 
but what happened was far from anything the women anticipated. The Igbos had naively 
assumed that the women would not be shot for protesting (Afigbo 1966). Not all the women 
were in support of the vandalism; the movement had become fragmented. This lack of unity 
was another weakness in the Women’s War. Traditional ‘sit ons’ were marked by their strong 
consensus but this war was performed on an unprecedented scale and it proved difficult to 
control. Each village self-selected a representative but the representatives did not appear to 
have any clear authority outside of their villages (Wipper 1985). This follows, because actors 
who have power in one space, may not necessarily have power in another (Gaventa 2006) 
Nevertheless, scholars argue that social movements contain people with heterogeneous 
identities and strategies that make it difficult for the movement to remain ‘solidaristic’ and 
well-organised (Giugni, McAdam and Tilly 1999; Poletta and Jasper 2001; Tilly 1979). The 
fragmentation shows that their space was not neutral and even though it was created to give 
voices to the less powerful, some turned out to be more vocal than others. 
The war was essentially a civil rights movement which had Igbo and Ibibio women fighting for 
their rights as citizens to participate in decision-making processes. When formal structures 
exclude women, they seek empowerment by engaging ‘with’ community groups (Lister 1997) 
Citizens should be allowed their power ‘to’ organise and be encouraged to participate but 
these women were not treated like citizens. They exercised the power they shared ‘with’ 
each other but this resulted in the deaths of some of their members. The Women’s War was 
an audacious reaction but not unorthodox. Since they were not invited into the 
administration’s closed spaces, they did not have many options to voice their concerns. The 
strength in their resistance lied in how quickly thousands of them mobilised and how they 
adapted their traditions to their situation. Overall, their men were in favour of the war (Van 
Allen 1972) and the space they created helped them determine their own scope for agency 
so that they became subjects rather than objects of their society. 
The British implemented some reforms but they nonetheless maintained their Eurocentric 
views of women. The Native Courts were changed to conform to more traditional Igbo 
standards except women were still not included and their views were not represented in court 
(Afigbo 1966). The movement occurred during the Victorian period when British women were 
publicly invisible (Van Allen 1975). The normative British notions of a woman’s place led 
them to view the Igbo women’s desire to create space in the political sphere as irrational. 
The British made efforts to eliminate corruption and this benefitted the women but they also 
deemed illegitimate, any extra-government institutions or traditional rituals (ibid.). This 
outlawry of the mitiri meant the women could no longer organise legally even against their 
indigenous people. After things quieted down, women were neglected in representation 
again and they were subsequently taxed (Wipper 1985). Research does not show how the 
resistance affected the most marginalised members of their movement but it can be 
concluded that the war failed to achieve permanent solutions. This is to be expected since 
research shows that ‘resistance [movements] often fail’ (McGee 2016: 209). The Women’s 
War was weakened because the British did not respect their traditions. ‘Sit ons’ were 
effective among the Igbo people however, when they ‘made war’ with the British, the women 
were essentially speaking another language. 
Christian missionaries began to convert the Igbos to Christianity and hence urged them 
against attending mitiri (Van Allen 1975) by using invisible power. The women capitulated. 
This form of power is harder to notice and it reflects the norms of the society which have 
been imposed from the top-down so that people will accept their existing circumstances 
(Gaventa 2006; IPAT 2015). The British used visible power ‘to’ obstruct the women from their 
political authority and the parallel effort by the missionaries served to tame the women, using 
invisible power. They might have continued resisting using their created spaces for citizen-
engagement but that is precisely what the British banned. The women may not have 
recognised the importance of invisible power. Because of the nature of institutions and 
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patriarchy, some argue that women can only be empowered if they reshape entire political 
structures (Sardenberg 2016). To have been successful, the women needed to concurrently 
employ different strategies that confronted power on multiple levels, forms and spaces 
(Gaventa 2006). The women had already created spaces to use their hidden power to resist 
visible power. Perhaps the women could have also confronted invisible power by creating 
invited spaces and challenging the ideologies the Church was teaching them. 
In conclusion, the major strength of the Women’s War was in how they managed to efficiently 
distribute their power ‘with’ and unite to make a stand. The two main weaknesses were: 1) 
their focus on visible power, and 2) the eventual fragmentation of the movement. They had 
some success when their initial demands were met and the officer was convicted. The 
movement failed largely due to elements such as patriarchy which were beyond their control 
and because some of their members turned violent. The outcome when citizens challenge 
authority, is not necessarily due to which party has more power. It is about how strategies 
are employed productively to address the scope of power. 
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In Search of Collaborative Relationships 
C. Neu 
1 Introduction 
We want to create together situations that lead to a rebuilding of positive and joyful 
modes of interdependence, and the creation of new forms of attachment in which the 
humanity of each individual is acknowledged. Here is a program for an ongoing 
revolution, where the central goal is not a fixed and future utopia known in advance, for 
which we have to sacrifice in the present, but rather a continuing practice of dialogue 
and restoration with the goal of building more humane communities. 
(Mary Watkins and Helene Shulman 2008: 28) 
What do they want? 
Robert Chambers 
This paper is a compilation of thoughts that have been requiring in my mind for the last four 
years, they are weaved together with a specific aim: exploring how collaborative relationships 
can be achieved and maintained. 
To start I want to bring back a memory. A casual meeting, with an unknown farmer in a 
maize grainer, of a small town called Ramiriquí in Colombia, keeps lingering in my mind. This 
man, a typical boyacense cultivator with his hat and ruana (poncho) compared himself to me 
by stating ‘anything you would do would be better than what I do, because you have a 
university degree’. I felt ashamed instead of flattered, answering back: ‘Look at my hand; 
they are like baby hands. Look at yours… your hands are the ones who feed me. My hands 
can’t do that. My diploma can’t take care of a plot of agriculture.’ 
I’ve had to use this story more than once. It still hurts because I see injustice and I see 
degradation, for example, of farmers’ knowledge and any person that doesn’t have a formal 
education. However, as I told the farmer, he has a certain type of knowledge that is as 
important or even more valuable than the one that I have constructed. There is a dichotomies 
embedded were one type of knowledge if more valued than the other. And this has change. 
From the standpoint of relationships, it becomes critical to understand what power is and 
how knowledge is created to comprehend what type of relationships we have in our societies 
and (if necessary) how these can be improved. How are the interactions between people in a 
relationship? How is power distributed? What type of knowledge is taken into account? 
Whose reality counts? (Chambers 2003). 
The current western relationships among people are surrounded by inequality and injustice. 
Power relationships create the knowledge of the reality we have, which is of oppression of 
some people and institutions over others. In other words, a hierarchical society. Evidently, 
the encounter with the farmer demonstrates in a way a suffering, in which we all live in, 
where not everyone is conscious of it, and as a result, it is reproduced and tolerated by most. 
How can a collaborative relationship be created and maintained, in a society that values 
certain types of knowledge’s over other, and were hierarchical forms of relationships prevail? 
This is the question to be explored in the following text. By using liberation psychology 
(Watkins and Shulman 2008) as an approach, structures of power embedded in our 
discourses and social interactions are untangled. To break open power relationships requires 
a cognitive justice (de Sousa Santos et al. 2008) and collaborative rebuilding of positive and 
joyful modes of interdependence among people and groups to transform the status quo. 
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I understand a collaborative relationship to be the balance of power between people, where 
there is capacity for dialogue (Watkins and Shulman 2008; Freire 2005), hence there is 
respect for different types of knowledge and mind-sets. Solidarity and mutual help is also 
implied and, lastly, collective actions are to be carried out. 
The Critical Enquiry into practice (CEP) I plan to set up is based on a 4 months project back 
in my home country, Colombia. With the current political and social conditions after the 
Peace Treaty signature and the forthcoming process of implementing the agreements, the 
task of civil societies’ organisation is to strengthen themselves and their relationships with 
the communities they are working with. The coming process of rebuilding the society will 
allow different approaches to flourish. There are organisations with similar understandings of 
what a collaborative relationships is, and it is of great interest to see and experience how 
they can be achieved during the context like Colombia’s current social transition. For these 
purposes I have so far contacted Corporación Otra Escuela (Otra Escuela) and Asociación 
de Trabajo Interdisciplinario (ATI), which I will further explain who they are and why they can 
be the means to develop my work. 
In the following pages I will present where all of this thoughts are coming from laying out 
experiences I have had. Then I will explore the conceptual framework necessary to answer 
my main question focusing on the links between relationships, power and knowledge. These 
concepts and their interrelationships will allow me to understand hierarchical relationships in 
contrast to collaborative relationships. By doing that, new fields of exploration will appear and 
it will allow me to deepen in the search for a collaborative relationship by explaining certain 
characteristics, and then how this can be achieved. Having said all of this, the possibilities 
that I have for my CEP in Colombia will be portrait. 
2 Where am I coming from? 
Since I graduated as an anthropologist at the University of los Andes in Bogotá, Colombia in 
2014, I’ve worked as a research anthropologist in three developmental projects in the 
country. Even though each one had a specific aim, they were all related to understand the 
food systems in different regions, with the objective of looking for alternative systems that 
would benefit small-scale farmers and vendors. These experiences allowed me to admire the 
complexity of social and cultural values and ideas behind the people working as craftsmen 
and craftswomen. Hence richness of popular knowledge could be found; network of families 
and friends supporting each other was evident, but at the same time we were confronted by 
their day to day struggle1 to survive in an economical structure privileging large scale 
farming, industrial production and supermarkets, while small scale production or vendors 
were neglected by society and forgotten by the politics. 
I always believed in the projects I was part of. Words of hope were in my conversations. 
Hope that the projects were going to provide them direct and diverse answers. This hope 
was weaved with care and respect towards them, in respect to their lives, their knowledge 
and their everyday efforts. With all of the three projects, I always felt that a relationship of 
trust was being created. 
Yet, I sense a one-way relationship was always lingering in the air. Were we really creating a 
relationship of trust? And what does that (i.e. Trust) mean? Dissimilarities were always there. 
I always felt to be seen as the girl (not woman) with European traits coming from the ‘capital’ 
(meaning Bogotá), and with privileges (i.e. Travel expenses). These dichotomies resided,  
  
                                               
1
 Thinking back also, their prevalent worries were economical (ie. Competitions from other type of businesses) and/or 
environmental issues (ie. water draughts were occurring more than normally.) Both threated their already struggled life 
and affected their only incomes. Basically, making them concern in how they were going to support their families. 
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even though I tried to break them, to make them understand that I could learn from them 
more than they could learn from me. The encounter with the boyacense farmer is just of 
example. 
I am not sure if I was able to transmit this message, and I even doubt what I was able to 
achieve in these experiences, because even though all of the projects had an aim to be 
applied research, it ended up being just a diagnosis or a research. So again I ask the 
questions: what kind of relationship did I really have with the communities? What kind of 
relationships can be really created in these types of projects? And even deeper and 
personal, why I am doing all of this, and why do I want to have a relationship with small poor 
farmers, small poor venders or any marginalised group or person?2 
In writing this paper, I have realised that I am in search of deconstructing my thoughts and 
my life. To critically disentangle assumptions, confront and understand where I come from 
and how I can move ahead with my CEP. My search for collaborative relationships can be 
explained as a way of being part of a society with a lot of injustice, where some are privileged 
and others are not; where some peoples’ knowledge is valued and others isn’t. My personal 
prospects have allowed me to see that this is not true, and even though I am still in an 
awaking process, this process helps me understand personal growth and needs. It is vital to 
look for ways to make this other knowledge’s be valued. Before looking for these 
approaches, basic concepts and their interrelationships have to be described. 
3 Power, knowledge, and relationships 
All relationships are surrounded by power and knowledge dynamics. Knowledge is 
exchanged in conversations and practices between people and/or institutions; and power 
dynamics surround this exchange. The knowledge generated by power, and the power 
generated by knowledge makes some things visible and invisible, valuable and invaluable; 
as for example expert’s knowledge over farmer’s knowledge. 
Foucault argues that power is everywhere. ‘It is diffused and embodied in discourses, 
knowledge and “regimes of truth” ’ (Powercube 2009). The latter, include and exclude certain 
types of knowledge’s, making some visible and dominant over other types of knowledge. In 
other words, power can be negative, oppressive, silencing and authoritarian. Nevertheless, 
Foucault (Powercube 2009) also says it can also be positive, innovative and resistant. 
Depending on the type of power exercised a type of knowledge is created and a ‘truth’ is 
constructed. 
The current dominant power/knowledge (Foucault and Gordon 1990) relationship is an 
oppressive type, where exclusion and marginalisation occurs, and relationships are ordered 
in a hierarchical manner. In the aid industry, this mind-set has been described as top-down 
approach (Chambers 2003). ‘Experts’ decide over marginalised communities, because the 
knowledge that the former has is considered to be objective, factual, reliable and, thus, 
legitimate. In a hierarchical relationship the ‘regime of truth’ of how knowledge and reality is 
created is one-way. 
This mind-set is embedded in all of us. It’s an ‘invisible power’ that’s normalised and 
naturalises this way of interactions (VeneKlasen and Miller 2002). Foucault relevance is seen 
for making visible exclusions that lead to an understanding of the existence different regimes 
of truths (de Sousa Santos 2003: 27). 
                                               
2
 The answers I come up with in current times, has different layers. First, because cultural and social history has 
interested me since I was a child (i.e. I was highly interested of the WW2). This then transitioned into my interest of 
traveling and to my first understandings of anthropology. I could work with people and I could be volunteering and/or 
helping them to have a better life. 
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To see that there are alternatives regimes of truth, or that there can be counter-hegemonies 
to use Gramsci’s terms (Powercube 2009), ideas such as epistemologies (plural) of the south 
can be developed as de Sousa Santos et al. (2008) proposes. Here a decolonisation 
proposal is set out, were power relationships of the oppressive are challenged by the 
oppressed with the aim to be completely transformed, and to have another epistemological 
understanding were diversity is privileged, and were former excluded knowledge’s are 
valued. All of this is very relevant in the current context of Colombia, were a society with a 
past of normalised violence is in search of peace. 
To achieve this it is necessary first to have ‘cognitive justice’ (de Sousa Santos et al. 2008), 
or ‘conscientisation’ from Freire (2005). Both have the aim of being aware of the dynamics of 
the hierarchical relationships so that they can be transformed. 
A useful framework to deconstruct the dynamics and see how power is distributed is the 
Power Cube. The latter is a compilation of different theories (Powercube 2009). It grasps 
power to be multidimensional and have interrelationships between the forms of power. All of 
this with the aim to assess the possibilities of transformative action in various spaces 
(Gaventa 2006: 25). In other words, see possible entry points so that strategies for change 
can happen, and in the case of trying to construct collaborative relationships, 
Colombia has a socio-cultural richness because of the diversity of its society, yet it is a 
country with a colonial past, and surrounded by a western mind-set. Foucault, de Sousa 
Santos, and the powercube provide lenses that could grasp the silences generated by the 
western mind-set, but also they provide the possibility to think of alternatives. 
4 Towards a collaborative relationship 
In a collaborative relationship there should be a fluid two-way or multiple-way dialogue, 
where everyone compromising and negotiating, hence change has to happen. Especially the 
more powerful have to change. Thus, there is not one type of knowledge of understanding 
the world and reality we live in. There are many perspectives and cosmologies which try to 
make sense in their own way the possible realities, with their own values and explanations 
(de Sousa Santos et al. 2008). 
A call to unite and act, within different types of knowledge systems is viewed in different 
places as for example VeneKlasen and Miller (2002: 12) who argue: 
by challenging dominant ideologies and worldviews, people not only deepen their 
understanding of power dynamics and themselves, they can begin the potential of 
solidarity and the common good. Organizing around worldview involves the creation of 
new spaces for inclusive, empowering community reflection and dialogue about what’s 
going on and why […] These processes also help to answer the question ‘what do we 
stand for?’ by supporting the articulation of alternative worldviews and agendas that 
incorporate rights, justices, equality and democracy. 
By seeing the entry points of possible change and being aware that oppressive power can be 
transformed, the aim is that the oppressed be liberated by themselves and not by 
development works or volunteers – because of the risk of reproducing hierarchies (Agrawal 
cited in Ashwood et al. 2014). Yet, because I am part of this society, and I myself have 
reproduced and may be reproducing oppressive structures, I want to and have to be part of 
this liberation. The liberation is happening also in my life. The figure of an ‘Ally’ gives the 
possibility to stand by the side of the most vulnerable and marginalised people. The person 
that chooses to be an ally (it is not an identity) understands that he/she hasn’t experienced  
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those injustices (Anti-Oppression Network n.d.), but that doesn’t make it acceptable that 
he/she stand by doing nothing.3 Solidarity, as VeneKlasen and Millers quote states above, 
has to occur, and it goes beyond development or aid discourses. 
Exploring psychologies of liberation from Watkins’ and Shulman’s (2008) teachings open a 
door to create a more humane society by looking and feeling directly injustice, so that the 
structures embedded in these oppressions be directly challenged and transformed. This can 
be achieved via critical understanding and with the help of creative dialogues and arts come 
up to equivalent solutions by means of a collaborative relationship to construct and/or 
maintain cultural and social environments. 
This awakening process and the search for solutions is a difficult task. It’s easy to fall back 
again in the dominant structure, were dichotomies exist, were hierarchies thought to have 
disappeared, still exist. This calls for a continually critical reflection to make horizontal 
relationships (Chambers 2003) happen. 
Hence, when this falling back starts to emerge in me, a reflection phase starts. I try to ask 
myself why I am doing all of this. I transport my thoughts into Colombia (very far from 
Brighton, and much further from IDS and the development discourses). My personal and 
professional life are the same. They are not separated, as many people want them to be. I 
choose to study and work on something because my life (with my family, in my school, with 
my friends, with my maid, etc.) have guided me to have encounters were I’ve experienced 
injustices, as for example with the boyacense farmer. As I can recall, the injustice were not 
done on me. Yet, I don’t feel that that is right. I do not understand how we can stand and do 
nothing. 
Hence, solidarity is needed and that is why I am pursuing collaborative relationships. The 
question of ‘how are collaborative relationships created and maintained’ have different 
scales, one is the awaking process, another one is the search of solutions and strategies to 
change and, in the long run, how to sustain it but at the same time be conscious of the 
constant change. 
All of these phases can help to be achieved through methodologies. The usage of 
methodologies such as theatre, games, storytelling, video and photography, just to name a 
few, could allow the emergence of alternative situations, actions and ideas out of the 
dominant mind-set. An exploration of these methodologies is what I would like to do in my 
CEP. How do organisations work towards collaborative and solidarity relationships? What is 
necessary in an organisation to build this type of interactions? How do organisations work 
towards a resistance hierarchical relations? Do they resist or do they reproduce them? These 
are some guiding questions for the selection of the organisations I am interested, and that I 
want to further explore in the coming months.4 
5 Colombia and two possibilities 
2016 was an important year in the history of Colombia because of the signed Peace Treaty 
between the government and the guerrilla group FARC. It has been a path with hopes and 
fears. In the discourses of hope and the beginning of peace, the result of the Plebiscite 
permitted to not overlook the divided society that we have: ones based in criteria around 
prejudices, lies and anger; and another, where people were ready to work within diversity to  
  
                                               
3 I would like to explore this deeper during my CEP, and specially see if there are Latin American ideas of allies, having 
seen that the ally politic is more from North America. 
4
 In Colombia, there is a talked about territorial peace, instead of projects being created in cities, they are conceived by 
the same people of the territories in their territories with their knowledge. Hence, the idea of ‘territory’, ‘territorial peace’ 
are concepts and a space that I want to explore more during my CEPT. 
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create a more united country without war or fear. I belong to the latter, and this is one of the 
reasons I want to return to Colombia as to experience and be part of this transformative 
change about to start. 
There are many civil society organisations building and strengthening the society in order to 
advance in a more equal societal environment. I have found two entities through which I 
could enrol for the CEP. One is called Asociación de Trabajo Interdisciplinario (ATI) and the 
other Corporación Otra Escuela (Otra Escuela). Both have shown within the diverse type of 
NGO, commitment towards people and conflict resolution into something positive and 
transformative. 
ATI (2014) is an interdisciplinary organisation that works with rural and urban communities 
around food sovereignty and food autonomy in Bogotá and the region of the state of 
Cundinamarca.5 With over thirty years’ experience, a group of around ten people who divide 
projects, ATI works in strengthening grassroots organisations applying participatory 
methodologies with a focus on popular education. The values and principles are guided by 
social and solidary economy, which are: trust, complementarity, responsibility, respect and 
justice (ATI 2014). The broader aim they have is to achieve a solidarity network were the gap 
between rural and urban decreases, and, hence to transform a structure by build territorial 
peace. 
Otra Escuela (2016) aims at building peace culture through innovative pedagogies and 
methodologies channelled by games and arts. Their approach is dialogical in all senses; first 
it is an on-going reflection process as individuals and as a collective matter; it binds 
constantly together reasoning and feelings with the hope to bring actions to success stories. 
Humanise social relationships, and create positive effects within groups from conflict on are 
some of their objectives. Their service repertoire is diverse ranging from working with 
communities to facilitating specialisations for professional interests. They work in different 
parts of the country, but mostly they try to reach vulnerable regions, which have suffered 
from the internal conflict. 
Despite I have addressed them in certain opportunities; so far I have not received any 
feedback in order to join them once I return to Colombia. However also, this type of answer 
requires a long-term conversation process and the common interest to fulfil needs and 
requirements. 
If there is no possibility to do my CEP with either of the previous organisation, I have backup 
plans. The closes would be to work with a friend in a social entrepreneurship (named Mawa) 
of handcrafts from indigenous communities from the Caribbean Coast of Colombia. The 
collaborative and solidarity approach would also apply for Mawa as for the relationship my 
friend is trying to build with the handcrafts communities. 
6 Conclusions 
In a context were certain types of knowledge’s prevail over others and were hierarchical 
relationships surround us, has taken me to a process of understanding some basic things of 
knowledge, power and relationships. This has allowed me to see the complexity of structures 
that are embedded in us as individual and as a society. These structures generate injustices 
and inequalities. Yet, my search is aligned with others people’s enquiry of social justice, 
collaboration and solidarity (de Sousa Santos 2003; ATI 2014; Otra Escuela 2016). 
  
                                               
5
 Cundinamarca is the state where Bogotá is located. 
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In Colombia this is the route that we should be looking for after fifty-two years of internal 
conflict. ATI’s and Otra Escuelas’ work is surrounded by the constant search of these three 
spaces. Both show that it is a political arena, were conflicts and contentious encounters will 
emerge. Yet, both have the aim of turning that conflict into something positive, and in 
awakening the most embedded oppressions in our daily live. Their work goes into 
transforming embedded invisible structures of power that we all have. An awaking process is 
necessary to take action and make the change happen. This exactly has to be done farmers 
such as the one from Ramiriquí. 
For the next term and for my Critical Enquiry into Practice I would like to deepen my 
understanding in solidarity theory and collaborative relationships, to see deeper the scope 
and limitations that they have. I would also want to confront (if it’s possible to confront) my 
doubt (enforced by external actors) about how viable and effective is my search and way of 
thinking about liberation and solidarity on an individual and collective level. How useful are 
techniques such as storytelling and theatre in valuing different types of knowledge’s, and 
hence crating a collaborative relationship. 
To sum up, an understanding of relationships, power and knowledge permits us to see 
oppression and collaboration; hierarchies and solidarity; division and unity. It is not a search 
to create division, or to reinforce dichotomies. It is a search to look for unity in diversity, and 
diversity in unity. 
Thus, it is an opportunity for unity among diversity, and diversity within unity. Unity to 
equilibrate trends, requirements and needs among a given community. Diversity required 
handling traditions, opinions, and settlements seeking for new ways to maintain 
craftsmanship among them. 
It is to co-create realities, projects and environments capable of understanding the need for 
change, for improvements and to sustain the interdependences of different stakeholders. 
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How does Rancière’s Distribution of the 
Sensible Speak to the Changes in the UK 
English Curriculum and How does His 
Notion of the Aesthetic Regime of the Arts 
Help Frame Unruly Acts? 
Luke Stannard 
1 Introduction 
The classroom is bustling. Conversations gurgle from every table, muffled laughter swirls as 
they read the swear words and ruin it for their friend, who hasn’t got there yet. 
‘Sir, you’ve forgotten to put capitals on this person’s name!’ smirks Pradeep. 
‘It’s meant to be like that’ 
‘Why would someone want to get rid of the capitals in their name?’ 
A shadow appears in the corner of my eye. It swallows the light coming through the frosted 
pane of the door. I haven’t taken the register yet either (you may laugh, but people get official 
warnings for less). The mass draws close. ‘Everyone, quick, look like you’re responding to 
my marking’ I exclaim in a shrill whisper. 
A couple of them look up, recognise the situation and calm their tables, the bustle goes flat. 
We draw breath. The door flies open. 
‘Mr Stannard. How are 10X performing this morning?’ 
I don’t respond. It’s a member of SLT. You’ve met the type: considers the arts soft and 
proclaims at every staff meeting that recent education reform is both strong and stable. A 
character from one of Dahl’s books. The students shuffle anxiously, quietly getting on with 
what they think they’re meant to write under the comments. She circles. Silently. The class 
mimic her silence. 
‘What a wonderfully quiet class you have produced here Mr Stannard’ 
She circles once again, it’s clear there is no purpose for this visit, just a quick haunt. Check 
that the class is ‘on task’. Learning is being done, knowledge copied down into books. As she 
leaves, she motions that I follow her. 
‘There’s no learning aim on the board, nor date. Completely unacceptable’ she declares 
without eye contact. She’s missed the poem, we’re in luck. She turns on her heels and 
silently glides off to her next line-up. 
* * * 
This paper is concerned with unruly acts, in ruly places. Spaces where the margins are being 
squeezed. Molotovs, masks and milk littered the connotations I held with such a word. 
However, I admit, a school is not the first place that comes to mind. The acts this paper  
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addresses are about the provision of art, creative spaces, so called dangerous texts, power, 
and play. It is concerned with attempts to give space for chaos in an environment burdened 
with the anxiety of league tables and funding cuts. 
I am writing about acts of unruly behaviour I took part in, with a number of the friends and 
young people I worked with at a school in the shadow of Terminal 3, in Southall, London. 
This paper will address these acts of unruliness through the lens of Jacques Rancière’s 
work: The Distribution of the Sensible. It will focus initially on his discussion of the distribution 
of the sensible, then onto his regimes of the arts, which I believe talk to the changes we have 
seen recently in the British education system. I will work from the ethical, through the 
representational and onto the aesthetic regime, which he maintains holds such potential for 
reimagining of our shared map of the sensible (Rancière 2006). To supplement my reading 
of these acts I will discuss Clarissa Hayward’s work De-Facing Power the insights for which 
were drawn from her experience in two schools in New York (Hayward 2000). 
Unruly politics is defined by Alex Shankland and colleagues as ‘political action by people who 
have been denied voice by the rules of the political game, and by the social rules that 
underpin this game’ (Shankland et al. 2011). It is not a common to consider teachers to be 
those who have been denied voice by the rules of the political game. Education is an 
institution. It is awash with ‘rules and procedures that are created and communicated... 
through channels widely accepted as official’ (Helme and Levitsky 2014: 727). The teachers 
working with the young people in the UK, work within the frameworks assigned to them by 
the Department of Education and enforced through organisations such as OFSTED the 
schooling inspectorate. It was the change to a number of these frameworks that led to these 
unruly acts. 
These unruly acts, took place in a space where the teachers have very little room for 
expression. Teachers and young people are being systematically denied the opportunity to 
engage in activities and spaces that allow for free thought and play. These acts addressed 
this poverty. They were subversive and we all ran the risk of disciplinary action or worse 
having classes we’d worked with for years taken off us. 
2 Power 
This paper considers power to be diffused across networks, boundaries and discourses 
(Gaventa 2006). It is not in the hands of a few, to be used over others, or Power-over as 
VeneKlassen et al. (2006) referred to it. Clarissa Hayward described it as a process that 
‘defines the fields of possibility’ (Hayward 2000: 11). In this context, it defines how a teacher 
acts, how students react to what they are presented, it moulds and shapes what we interpret 
education to be, what forms of activities deserve merit and are valid. This paper maintains 
that teachers are as much subjects of these power relations as anyone else is, ‘all social 
actors, then are situated within power relations’ (ibid.). 
Teachers’ in this country are greatly maligned and very often voiceless. Except, that is, until 
they take matters into their own hands, as they have, and continue to do, every day, in 
schools all over this country. 
3 The modern British academy 
The introduction to this paper is not embellished. The Education Secretary at the time of the 
curriculum reforms famously described teachers as ‘enemies of promise’ (McQuilan 2013). It 
was a hostile environment. There is a fear in teaching now. I was a secondary school teacher 
for five years in London, it was an ‘outstanding’ school according to the six foot high banner 
attached to the front gates. The staff, for the most part, were intelligent, passionate and 
dedicated people, and the young people were superlative. 
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In that time a lot has changed. To provide context in that time frame: curriculums changed 
completely; coursework was scrapped; entire subjects removed; performance related pay 
enforced; teaching assistant posts reduced; new grading mechanisms introduced with no 
grade boundaries provided; days extended and climate change removed from the 
Geography curriculum (for example). These are but a few changes that we experienced as a 
collective. This list is intended to provide a flavour of the environment, not a comprehensive 
assessment. 
This paper focuses on the changes to the English literature curriculum. The first year-group 
of young people pushed through this assessment mangle will be sitting their second literature 
exam at about the time this paper lands on your desk. 
4 The unruly act 
Over the course of three terms we stopped teaching the exam, for at least a lesson a week. 
We were not allowed to do this and it was explicitly forbidden. This sounds small, but I do not 
think that takes away from the action. The young people we worked with had very little space 
to enjoy the subject matter, these acts gave them that space. The work completed in these 
sessions was never assessed formally. Discussions were had and that’s what we valued as 
important. Some of these texts reflected the backgrounds they were from, some didn’t. Each 
teacher chose his or her own texts to work with, then as the space developed students 
brought their own texts. 
On reflection, I don’t think the most unruly aspect was the texts. I think the unruly act was in 
fact, the space. For forty-five minutes (most) weeks, the students produced work they knew 
wouldn’t be assessed, they wrote: poems, lyrics, short stories, tweets and descriptions. They 
also argued and fought, but this should not detract from it. They chatted, laughed and 
engaged in serious play. It may not seem much, but it brought us all closer, it showed some 
that they are creative people with a voice worth listening to. 
The introductory passage of this paper took place during one of these ‘free spaces’ and the 
students covered for me, all of us really. They protected the space. I believe, in an institution 
as authoritarian as the school we found ourselves in, was something to be proud of. 
5 The distribution of the sensible 
How does this relate to Rancière’s thoughts on the distribution of the sensible? Well it 
requires us to consider all of the regimes of the arts, not just the aesthetic, so that this act 
can be properly situated as means of engaging in the distribution of the sensible. 
Rancière defined the distribution of the sensible as a ‘system of self-evident facts about 
sense perception’ (Rancière 2006: 1). He was clear that this is with regards to the ‘western 
tradition’ (ibid.: 20) of art. It is easy in a consumer driven society such as ours to narrow this 
to objects of art, but Rancière claimed it was greater than this. 
‘Sense perception’ implies that this as a system that is pre-speech. It is then an aspect of 
cognition or framing of those who are within a particular order of culture. It is about our ideas 
of art, our patterns of speech and hierarchies of knowledge or genre. My interpretation is that 
it is the process in which types of art the nouns, so to speak, are constituted. Also, the acts of 
artistic interpretation, ‘ways of doing and marking’ (ibid.: 13) are constructed, the verbs of art. 
They are both subject to appropriation, cooption and integration into the fabric of what is 
legitimate and sensible. 
The French word partage has been translated into English as distribution. Partage has a 
duplicity of meanings. It can mean partition or division, here it is most closely associated it 
with its British cousin. Its other meaning is the sharing of something (Rockhill 2006). This is 
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where some of the unruliness lives in my opinion. To share something requires exchange 
and in an exchange you are fragile. 
If you share a language of identification of the arts, if you share the recognition of art and its 
purpose, and you share the reproduction of its conventions, then this is not simply a top 
down process. It is not Power over in the traditional sense, it is more complicated than that. If 
the aesthetic regime affords you the chance to engage with a text in the ‘singular’ and 
redefine your distribution of the sensible and that is shared, then the system is fluid. 
6 Ethical regime 
The first regime of art that Rancière draws attention to is the ‘Ethical regime’ (Rancière 
2006). This is the regime that questions the ‘origin (and consequently their truth content) and 
the question of their end or purpose’ (ibid.: 20) of a text. It is, in part, a question of where 
texts have come from. It is the realm in which the ‘status and signification of the image’ (ibid.: 
21) is anointed and its position within a taxonomy of images is ascertained. In the case of 
this change to curriculum, the dismissal of the majority of the world’s literary texts, renders 
those that are canonised and taught, as being within the ethical regime. Those considered 
appropriate for these young people to learn, hold a privileged position in the distribution of 
the sensible. 
It is within the ethical regime that we see the most overt reference to power structures which 
predominate our experience of art. It is for those with a certain education or occupation 
(ibid.), trophies of identity that are not often extended to the students in these economically 
deprived schools. These schools are spaces that sit outside of the white, broad leafed Britain 
so aggressively invoked in the modern English literature curriculum, through its veneration of 
the likes of Keats, Byron and Austen. 
In this regime Rancière concerns himself with those who have the power not only to produce 
such images, and define their destination but also place a ‘ban’ (ibid.: 20) on them. My 
interpretation is that this does not ban their circulation, it is more insidious than that, it is a 
prohibition of their right to worth. This I feel is where the violence of the changes to our 
curriculum becomes so apparent. The young people we work with, in these ruly spaces, do 
not often see people of similar ethnicities, religions, or their families’ economic positions 
being included in this list of worthy texts. The arrogant assumption that students do not care 
about these changes is farcical and indicative of the ethical regimes preoccupation with 
those of certain educations having a right to speak. 
7 The representative regime 
The second regime of the arts Rancière refers to is the ‘poetic- or representative’ (ibid.: 21). 
This focuses on the ‘substance of the arts’. It is, in some respects, to do with art as a verb. 
This regime is not solely concerned with the reproduction of art or mimesis which I interpret 
as Rancière referring to the imitation of behaviour of one group of people, as opposed the 
presenting the real world in art. It is about how it is seen, or read after it has been produced 
as much as reproduction. This regime frames the means and language of interpretation. 
Whereas the ethical regime is concerned more overtly with where, for whom and by whom 
art is produced, this regime is concerned with how it is read, viewed and reproduced. It is ‘a 
regime of visibility’ (ibid.: 22) not so much where but how a text is read. It is in this respect 
that I refer to it as the verb in art. He talks of the distribution of the sensible being a means of 
differentiating between ‘speech and noise’ (ibid.: 13) and this is the regime I feel this is most 
apparent. It gives order to artists’ actions. For a text to become legible it requires more than 
the foundations of its purpose and the lineage of its author. To read art from lexis you need 
to be able to break down the text into a collation of signifiers, to understand how to ‘read’ the 
text, and this I believe is the regime most closely associated with this. 
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The new English Language curriculum as an approach champions a framing of the language 
of interpretation (all curriculums do). This language, to achieve a level 4, which (we’re told) is 
the equivalent of a C at GCSE, the students’ response must show ‘clear explanation of 
writer’s methods with appropriate use of relevant subject terminology’ (AQA 2017: 6). This 
can be read as evidence of ‘proper ways of doing and making as well as assessing 
imitations’ (Rancière 2006: 22). Students are required to learn what is good poetry, prose or 
verse, and how to reproduce the deconstructed elements identified. It does not propose, at 
this level, that they are critical of what they have been presented with. The origins (ethical 
regime) are not to be questioned, but they are taught to recognise its worth, accept it and 
then work to replicate it. Their responses must ‘unpick how the text works and what the writer 
is doing’ (AQA 2017: 6), there is no mention of why. It is prescriptive. The ‘learner’ is 
therefore not excluded from this regime of seeing; they are systematically inducted into how 
to see it. The learners are required to be able to recognise elements of artistic excellence 
that ‘exclusively belonging to an art and assessed, within this framework, as good or bad’ 
(Rancière 2006: 21–22). It can be read as building an ability to recognise pre-existing 
taxonomy’s of artistic worth, much as this regime is concerned with the ‘hierarchy of genres 
according to the dignity of their subject matter’ (ibid.: 22). It is here that the restrictive and 
narrow pallet of literature on the curriculum can be considered something worthy of 
subversion. 
If we take these two regimes of the arts into consideration, they compound and influence one 
another. The ethical regime concerns itself with a texts origins and genealogy, from a menu 
we have seen refocused along narrow nationalist lines. When we consider the representative 
regime, explained as the tools for deciphering or reading of a text that inform the 
reproduction of art. We see a cross pollination of these regimes means of control. This is 
where we see the violence in this curricular change. The students ‘means of analysis’ 
(representative) is limited to the ‘texts’ (ethical) they’re being asked to decipher. This process 
‘defines the fields of possibility’ (Hayward 2000: 11) of what a text can look like, how a text 
can be read, and who is in a position to produce it. 
8 Aesthetic regime 
The aesthetic regime is the final of Rancière’s regimes of the arts, and where the opportunity 
for a reorganisation of the ‘sensible’ is possible. This regime ‘strictly identifies art in the 
singular and frees it from specific rule’ (Rancière 2006: 23). It is a ‘pure instance of 
suspension, a moment when form is experienced for itself’ (ibid.: 23). Our unruly space 
allowed us to engage in texts for no other reason than intrigue, not outside but slightly 
removed from the overt pressures of the exam. The aesthetic regime stands in opposition to 
the representative regimes (ibid.) control over how a text is read. It claims to allow the 
individual to read the text in a moment without from the weight of history or in this case the 
weight of summative assessment. It brings the emotion back into the reading of art and 
unruliness. 
This moment, or regime ‘is a system of possibilities’ (ibid.: 50) to read a text in a manner that 
is not dominated by the representative regime. It provides an opportunity to change the 
individuals understanding of a piece of art, or art itself. Our unruly space was a suspension of 
the normal rules, in a way it was a space where collectively we engaged with texts and 
activities that reshaped how we looked at English literature, and for me personally, how I 
viewed education. 
The aesthetic regime is a ‘new regime for relating to the past’ (ibid.: 24). Whereas the ethical 
and representative regimes present a curated form of the past that is structured through 
those in positions of power, this regime allows the individual to redraw their own map of 
history. In the case of our unruly action we engaged with bell hooks’ anger, with Fanon’s 
view of colonial history, and Kate Tempest’s London. These texts are a world away from the 
empirical literature of the curriculum. This space gave all of us an opportunity to reflect on 
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this multiplicity of histories, and that is something Rancière argues the aesthetic provides. It 
was a process that broadened our views of literature and teaching, it expanded our horizons 
and caused me to evaluate the structures of power within education. 
I am not convinced that an act can be in complete suspension of our history and past as 
Rancière claims the aesthetic to be. A text’s connotations are in dialogue with the culture it 
inhabits. Our language and culture is a palimpsest for our readings of any text, and I do not 
believe we can ever be in complete suspension from this. However, I read the aesthetic 
regime as something that can be kept present in mind, to allow for such spaces to develop 
outside of a summative framework then we can develop a more nuanced interpretation of 
history. It is important that in schools young people have space to play. To engage on their 
own terms so as to build a sense of what they regard as important, not what they are told is 
important. 
It was a season of unruly acts that worked to redefine for all of us involved what English 
literature can or could be. The texts led to conversations surrounding the formulation of 
British history that many of the students stated they felt excluded from. The hope is that, in 
the provision of these spaces, individually and collectively we can build our own 
understandings of history. Understandings that challenge the narrative so readily evoked in 
the modern English curriculum and question the construction, and means of assessing, what 
is deemed ‘proper literature’. 
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Using Examples, Analyse how Climate 
Change will Increase Disaster Risk 
Alexander Vougioukas 
1 Introduction 
Disaster risk is a function of two variables: hazards and vulnerability (Blaikie et al. 2004). 
Though hazards are natural, disasters are socially constructed and only occur when a hazard 
hits vulnerable people. Climate change will affect both variables; it will increase the 
frequency and magnitude of hazards, and will increase vulnerability to disasters by affecting 
natural variability, changing climatic trends and through slow onset changes. The main 
consequences of this will be undermining livelihoods, increasing risks for people who live in 
dangerous locations and unprotected buildings, and contributing to rapid urbanisation. 
Answering this question requires a method of understanding the causes of current disaster 
risk, before assessing how climate change will affect those drivers. The Pressure and 
Release (PAR) model will be used for this purpose, and applied on to the drivers of disaster 
risk this model identifies will be the four different ways climate change will take effect. 
Examples from disasters that were caused by various kinds of natural hazards will be used in 
this assessment. Critically, the non-hazard impacts of climate change affect vulnerability and 
therefore increase disaster risk for all hazards, including those which will be unaffected by 
climate change. Having established the mechanisms by which climate change will increase 
disaster risk, this paper will query the assumption in the question: whether climate change 
will always increase disaster risk. 
The question is about the processes by which climate change will increase disaster risk. This 
paper is not about climate projections or the level of uncertainty in climate models, nor is it a 
detailed analysis of the drivers of current vulnerability or disaster risk. Furthermore, this 
paper will tackle the question on a macro-level. Assessing how climate change will increase 
disaster risk for any one specific location on a micro-scale is outside the scope of this paper, 
requiring both significant qualitative data to understand the current drivers of vulnerability in 
that locale, and small-scale projections to determine the likely impacts of climate change 
there. 
2 Frameworks 
2.1 The PAR model 
This paper will use the PAR model to assess current disaster risk (ibid.). As shown above, 
the model visualises a disaster as occurring in the middle of two pressures: the causes of 
vulnerability on the left hand side and the hazard event on the right. The model divides the 
processes that create vulnerability into a causal hierarchy comprised of three parts: unsafe 
conditions, the immediate situation people live in, dynamic pressures, the medium term 
processes that facilitate the creation of unsafe conditions, and root causes, the long term 
underlying factors. This model is useful in answering how climate change will increase 
disaster risk because it is specifically intended to examine vulnerability to disasters, and it 
delineates everything from historic causes to the immediate day-to-day reasons people are 
vulnerable to hazards. This separation of factors means the different impacts of climate 
change can be applied on top, to assess how it will affect each factor. 
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Figure 2.1 The PAR model 
 
Source: At Risk: Natural Hazards, Blaikie et al. (2004: 51). © 2004 Ben Wisner, Piers Blaikie, Terry Cannon and Ian Davis. 
Reproduced by permission of Taylor & Francis Books UK. 
The Access model, deriving from the authors’ self-criticism, is designed to be complementary 
to the PAR model (ibid.). Whereas the PAR model can be applied at the macro-scale this 
paper is focussed on, the Access model evaluates vulnerability at the household level, 
involving data requirements higher than this paper allows for. However, to its advantage, 
Access is an iterative model that looks at vulnerability during and after a disaster, whereas 
the PAR model is static. This paper will attempt to include this benefit of the Access model in 
its analysis; by increasing the magnitude and frequency of hazards, climate change will 
increase disaster risk by forcing people to cope with more damaging hazards more often, 
decreasing their capacity to respond to the next hazard. 
Other frameworks were assessed for use in this paper but were deemed too limited for the 
requirements of this analysis. DFID’s Sustainable Livelihoods Approach (DFID 1999) and 
CARE’s Household Livelihood Security Assessments (CARE 2002) are not about disaster 
risk specifically, but, like the Access model, offer insights into how decisions about 
livelihoods are made and why people are willing to accept a certain level of risk. However, 
vulnerability is about more than just livelihoods, and the PAR model is a more holistic 
approach that assesses the bigger picture which is key in explaining how disaster risk 
increases. These frameworks were also too micro-scale, with data requirements too high for 
this paper. The UNDP’s Disaster Risk Index (UNDP 2004) was also examined, and is useful 
for comparing disaster risk between countries, but not for this paper’s purpose of assessing 
the causes of vulnerability. 
2.2 The impacts of climate change 
Having established a model to assess the current causes of vulnerability to disasters, it is 
necessary to define the processes by which climate change will affect them. Climate change 
will have four impacts: affecting hazards, increasing variability, changing trends, and slow 
onset changes. These can be divided by the timescales over which they occur (Smit et al. 
2000). Hazards are short-term isolated events such as floods, droughts and storms. 
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Increased variability manifests over the medium-term, and includes changing or increasing 
the frequency or probability of climate variables, the seasons, and ENSO (El Niño-Southern 
Oscillation). Trends occur over the longer-term, and include changes in mean temperatures, 
precipitation and climate patterns. Slow onset changes occur over very long periods, and 
include sea level rise and melting glaciers (IPCC 2014b; Kehinde 2014); they are outcomes 
that are new and unique to climate change whereas the others alter the frequency or 
probability distributions of natural climate variability (Smit et al. 2000). Though these effects 
are not discrete, with, for example, hazards resulting from increased variability, it is useful as 
a framework to delineate the impacts to enable an assessment of the mechanisms by which 
climate change will increase disaster risk. 
How climate change affects each of the drivers of vulnerability will be assessed, with 
examples highlighting some of the consequences for people on the ground. Though for the 
purposes of this analysis the different drivers of vulnerability are being taken individually, it is 
important to remember that they act together. For example, a decline in soil productivity and 
other natural resource degradation undermines the livelihoods that are dependent on them. 
Also, factors described in the PAR model that will be unaffected by climate change, like a 
lack of press freedom, will not be discussed below. 
3 Applying the frameworks: how climate change will increase disaster risk 
After analysing how climate change will affect the hazard side of the PAR model, for the left 
hand side of the model this chapter will analyse unsafe conditions first, then dynamic 
pressures and root causes, as the impacts of climate change on the causes of vulnerability 
move from being more direct to more diffuse in this order. For clarity, within these 
subsections, the drivers of vulnerability will be discussed in the order the PAR model uses. 
3.1 Hazards 
This section will assess how climate change will affect hazards, the right hand side of the 
PAR model. Increasing the magnitude and frequency of hazards is one of the four impacts of 
climate change. However, more frequent tropical cyclones in the middle of the ocean do not 
cause disasters; what is important is how people’s disaster risk will be increased by the 
impacts of climate change on hazards. This will occur in two ways. Firstly, by increasing the 
intensity of hazards, climate change will magnify existing situations where the risks are 
already apparent (IPCC 2014a). For example, the 2010 flash floods in Pakistan resulted from 
heavy monsoon rain, caused by record high sea surface temperatures due to climate change 
and ENSO, resulting in unusually abundant atmospheric moisture (Trenberth and Fasullo 
2012), and causing huge damage, even though floods are common there (Mahmood, Khan 
and Ullah 2016). Secondly, due to the spatial extension of hazards, climate change will 
increase physical exposure, with hazards hitting new places and people. In particular floods 
and droughts will affect greater areas, and salinisation will affect delta regions (IPCC 2012). 
An example is the 2003 heatwave in Europe, where such hazards are historically rare, and 
which resulted in over 70,000 additional deaths (Robine et al. 2008). Climate change 
increased the risk of the occurrence of such an event (Stott, Stone and Allen 2004), and 
similar heatwaves are predicted to become more common (Beniston 2004). However, 
vulnerability is a subset of exposure, and not everyone who is newly exposed to a hazard will 
suffer harm if they have access to resources that decrease their risk. 
The other impacts of climate change, increased variability, trends and slow onset changes, 
will also affect the hazard side of the PAR model. Meteorological hazards are a natural 
phenomenon and result from natural variability; climate change will exacerbate this 
variability, increasing the likelihood of a threshold being surpassed and a hazard situation 
occurring. For example, unusually high precipitation can result in a flood. Trends affect the 
mean, increasing, for example, the likelihood of a heatwave or a drought, or worsening their 
effects (Smit et al. 2000). Slow onset changes will exacerbate some kinds of hazards. For 
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example, sea level rise will affect hazards in coastal areas through increasing the physical 
risk of flooding and increasing storm surge damage from cyclones (Van Aalst 2006). 
Climate change will not affect all kinds of hazards; there is no evidence climate change or 
sea level rise will influence volcanic eruptions or earthquakes (McGuire, Mason and Kilburn 
2002). However, climate change will alter the left hand side of the PAR model for both 
climatic and non-climatic hazards, and this chapter will now assess how climate change will 
affect the economic, social, cultural and political factors that determine vulnerability. 
3.2 Unsafe conditions 
The key purpose of this analysis is to determine how climate change will affect the drivers 
that already cause vulnerability. Living in a dangerous location already contributes to disaster 
risk; the question is how climate change will make such factors even more dangerous. 
People’s physical environment is a key driver of their vulnerability to disasters, and acting 
upon this is one of the most significant ways climate change will increase disaster risk. 
People who live in dangerous locations are at increased risk from disasters because they are 
more exposed to hazard events. However, this is an example of how risks are perceived 
differently; in locations where some people see livelihood opportunities, DRR organisations 
only see the dangers from potential hazards. Climate change will have a huge impact on 
increasing disaster risk for people who are already vulnerable because they live in 
dangerous locations. Such people are put at further risk from the increased intensity and 
frequency of hazards due to climate change, because to their high level of exposure. For 
example, living on hillsides make people vulnerable to landslides, coastal areas vulnerable to 
storms, and low lying areas, floodplains or near to rivers makes them vulnerable to floods 
(IPCC 2014a). Furthermore, sea level rise will affect those living in coastal areas, through 
salination of water resources and increased risk from storms. 
The impacts of climate change will also exacerbate the dangers from living in unprotected 
buildings. People who are unable to afford to live in buildings that are well constructed and 
maintained are more vulnerable to hazards, and are risking injury or death should the 
building collapse as a result of the stress from a hazard. Climate change will exacerbate this 
risk in two ways. Firstly, by increasing the strength and frequency of hazards, with for 
example the winds from tropical cyclones causing structural damage to buildings and 
property, and secondly through increased variability. For example, increased summer drying 
can cause ground shrinkage, which can damage building foundations (Van Aalst 2006). The 
consequences of living in an unsafe building in a dangerous location can be severe when a 
hazard hits: 30,000 people were killed and 100,000 were displaced by flash flooding and 
mudslides in the coastal, hillside slums of Caracas, Venezuela in 1999 (Blaikie et al. 2004). 
Climate change will put livelihoods increasingly at risk. Examples of currently dangerous 
livelihoods suggested by Blaikie et al. (2004) include ocean fishing in small boats and wildlife 
poaching. Climate change will expand this to almost any livelihood that is dependent on 
natural resources (IPCC 2014a). Indeed, all four impacts of climate change will affect 
livelihoods. Through its effects on hazards, climate change will increase the disruption of 
livelihoods. Increased variability and trends will work together to undermine agricultural 
livelihoods through increasing stresses, whilst sea level rise will destroy the livelihoods of 
people living in low-lying coastal areas. As an example, fishery-based livelihoods will be 
affected by all four effects of climate change; hazards will disrupt operations, whilst increased 
variability, trends and sea level rise will result in critical ecological and biological changes to 
marine and freshwater ecosystems and their resident fish populations (Badjeck et al. 2010). 
Therefore, by placing more livelihoods at risk, climate change will increase disaster risk, as it 
will reduce people's capacity to adapt and cope with hazards. 
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Low income levels are another issue climate change will exacerbate. Poverty and disaster 
risk are not identical but are often closely linked (Blaikie et al. 2004). A lot of disaster risk can 
be mitigated through having access to financial resources, whether that is through insurance, 
having savings, or simply being able to afford to live in less hazardous conditions in the first 
place. People who are already vulnerable because of their low incomes will have their 
disaster risk increased by climate change’s impacts on hazards and variability. Hazards will 
wipe out their current assets, and they will not have access to the resources necessary to 
rebuild and restore what was lost. Increased variability will put pressure on their livelihoods, 
and because of their low incomes, coping with even a short disruption will be challenging, 
with being able to purchase enough food quickly becoming an issue. 
Disaster preparedness is key in both helping people to avoid the approaching threats from 
hazards and in providing assistance to those affected after the event, though many 
communities lack disaster preparedness even for the magnitudes of hazards that currently 
occur. The hazard impact of climate change, making hazards more frequent and intense, will 
only serve to exacerbate this; as climatic extremes are covariant risks, which affect a wide 
range of people in an area simultaneously, current safety nets will become overwhelmed 
(UNDP 2008). 
The prevalence of endemic diseases will also be increased by climate change, through the 
impacts of increasing variability and changing trends. For example, cholera is sensitive to 
climate variability (Rodo et al. 2002), which will be exacerbated by climate change. The 2008 
cholera epidemic in Zimbabwe affected around 92,000 people and killed over 4,000 (Mason 
2009), with the outbreak amplified by the onset of the rainy season (Luque Fernández et al. 
2009). Such epidemics can be expected to become more frequent with climate change. 
Trends will affect other diseases as well. For example, warmer global average temperatures 
will likely see mosquitos spreading malaria over greater areas (Patz et al. 2002), with up to 
300 million additional people at risk of malaria globally in 2080 due to climate change 
(Martens et al. 1999). By increasing the prevalence of endemic diseases, thereby affecting 
people’s health and capacity to earn an income, climate change will increase disaster risk. 
3.3 Dynamic pressures 
Increased variability and trends will increase vulnerability by exacerbating a lack of 
appropriate skills and local investments. As climate change disrupts the conditions under 
which livelihoods had been carried out, previously held knowledge, techniques and 
investments will become insufficient to deal with the new status quo (IPCC 2014a). 
Rapid urbanisation will be affected by climate change through all four of its impacts. 
Migration to cities is often a common response after a disaster has occurred, making rural 
families destitute, and the impact of climate change on hazards would exacerbate this driver 
of urban migration (Black et al. 2011a). However, the stresses climate change puts on rural 
livelihoods through increased variability and changing trends also contribute to rural to urban 
migration, whilst slow onset changes like sea level rise will displace entire communities, who 
will likely be forced to move to urban areas to find new livelihoods. 
Climate change will contribute to a decline in soil productivity through increased variability, 
trends and slow onset changes. Areas where increased variability results in more frequent 
and intense precipitation events will increase wind and water erosion rates. The increases in 
average temperatures will result in salinisation of the soil, as evapotranspiration will be 
greater than precipitation and irrigation, whilst rising sea levels will increase flood incidence 
and salinity along coastal regions (Brevik 2013; IPCC 2014a). 
Therefore the four impacts of climate change will worsen many of the unsafe conditions and 
dynamic pressures the PAR model identifies as increasing people’s disaster risk. 
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3.4 Root causes 
Root causes are the political and economic systems that determine the distribution of power 
and access to assets in a society, and people who lack access are more vulnerable to 
disasters. Though dealing with the root causes is essential to reducing vulnerability, it is not 
clear how climate change will affect these factors, and any impact is likely to be diffuse, with 
causation likely impossible to prove. 
Klein (2007) argues natural disasters have been used as a pretext to further neoliberal 
ideology and institute economic reforms; for example, she contends corporate taxes were 
cut, regulations were eliminated and the public school system was replaced by charter 
schools after Hurricane Katrina. By increasing the likelihood of disasters through its impacts 
on both hazards and the drivers of vulnerability discussed above, it is possible climate 
change could make such societal reforms more likely. Giroux (2004) argues neoliberalism 
erodes public participation in democratic life and is behind the failure to tackle the problems 
of poverty and health in the USA, saying its proponents view people as expendable in the 
pursuit of profit. Therefore it could be argued climate change could contribute to creating 
situations where, as corporate vested interests become more dominant, people could have 
even less access to power, resources and the political system, and are therefore at greater 
risk from disasters. Whilst this is the most speculative assessment in this paper, it serves to 
illustrate the complexities in assigning causality and how climate change could affect the root 
causes of vulnerability under certain circumstances. 
3.5 The example of Bangladesh 
Having established which impacts of climate change will affect the drivers of vulnerability 
identified in the PAR model, this subsection will attempt to illustrate how this could work in 
practice, and show the nuances and complexities of the interactions between the impacts of 
climate change and the factors that cause vulnerability. The example used is a hypothetical 
hazard affecting Dhaka, though it will be based on the current context and drivers of 
vulnerability, along with the addition of the likely consequences of climate change. 
In Bangladesh moving to cities is a common coping strategy after floods, with 22 per cent of 
the households affected by tidal-surge floods and 16 per cent affected by riverbank erosion 
migrating to urban areas (Black et al. 2011a). This will be fuelled by the impact of climate 
change on hazards, increasing their frequency and intensity. However, urban migration will 
also be driven by the other effects of climate change; through increased variability and trends 
affecting rural agricultural livelihoods, which combined with the growing population of 
Bangladesh, will reduce both the productivity of and access to the natural resources that are 
essential for rural livelihoods like fisheries and forests (Black et al. 2011b). Rice, 
Bangladesh’s main crop, is especially sensitive to increasing temperatures and a decline in 
the length of the monsoon, both of which have already been observed (Rahman et al. 2007). 
It is also likely climate change will contribute to a decline in soil productivity due to increased 
salinity in coastal areas. Therefore climate change will also result in urban migration by 
affecting rural livelihoods and incomes. 
However, climate change is rarely the only factor, and in this case there are also pull factors 
behind the migration to cities; urban incomes are more secure as they are usually wage-
based, and this applies even in slums, with employment usually successfully found in Dhaka 
almost immediately after arriving (Black et al. 2011b). Most migrants to Dhaka do live in the 
slums, which are growing around 4 per cent per year and account for 86 per cent of the total 
urban population (ibid.). Slums are usually located in dangerous areas such as flood plains 
or the low-lying islands (known locally as char) that emerged from silt deposition in the river 
estuaries of the delta regions, and they are particularly liable to be hit by cyclones and river 
flooding (Blaikie et al. 2004). Therefore these migrants will have moved from one place of 
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environmental danger to a new one in Dhaka, and they will have been forced to live in 
unprotected buildings and in dangerous locations. 
At this point the hypothetical hazard hits. For argument’s sake, this hazard is an earthquake; 
this is plausible, as the Earthquake Disaster Risk Index ranks Dhaka among the 20 cities 
most at risk of earthquakes in the world (World Bank 2013). Even though climate change will 
not influence the likelihood or magnitude of the earthquake, all the other non-hazard impacts 
of climate change on the drivers of vulnerability from the left hand side of the PAR model 
have increased the disaster risk for the people of Dhaka. 
However, if this hypothetical hazard was meteorological, like a flood resulting from heavy 
precipitation, climate change could have also had an effect on the right hand side of the PAR 
model, by increasing the intensity or likelihood of the hazard occurring. Whether or not 
Dhaka’s disaster preparations would be able to cope would depend on the magnitude of the 
hazard event, though again one of the impacts of climate change is to make such 
phenomena more severe. The combination of the hazard event and the underlying causes of 
vulnerability would then create a disaster. 
This in turn could result in an outbreak of disease; for example as surface water gets 
contaminated outbreaks of intestinal diseases like diarrhoea and cholera have occurred in 
Bangladesh during and after floods (Toufique and Islam 2014; Brouwer et al. 2007). 
Therefore, this hypothetical disaster shows how the different drivers of vulnerability in the 
PAR model are interrelated, and how the four impacts of climate change can combine with 
the other contextual factors that cause disaster risk, and further increase the risk. 
4 Will climate change always increase disaster risk? 
As illustrated above, climate change will increase disaster risk, primarily through increasing 
the impact of and exposure to hazards and by affecting livelihoods. However, the assumption 
that climate change will always increase disaster risk should be questioned. For instance, it 
is likely the disaster risk of some people, particularly the wealthy in developed countries, will 
be unaffected by climate change as they have such high adaptive capacity and access to 
resources and coping strategies (CAFOD 2014). 
It is also possible climate change could decrease disaster risk for some people. The IPCC 
definition of adaptation to climate change includes the aim to ‘exploit beneficial opportunities’ 
(IPCC 2012: 5), implying climate change could have positive effects, resulting in a reduction 
in vulnerability for some people. In some areas livelihoods could become more secure, or 
new livelihoods will become viable. For example, some species of fish might become more 
abundant (Badjeck et al. 2010), decreasing vulnerability for some fishing livelihoods, and 
grapevine cultivation will become possible for new areas in northern Europe (Moriondo et al. 
2013), allowing for diversification of agricultural livelihoods. However, the processes of 
climate change, in particular the trend of increasing average temperatures that could 
facilitate improved agricultural livelihoods in some northern countries, will increase the 
vulnerability of people elsewhere by harming their agricultural opportunities (IPCC 2014a). 
Furthermore, whilst it was suggested above climate change could result in political and 
economic reforms that increase disaster risk, the opposite could also be true in some cases. 
Blaikie et al. (2004) argue the mass trauma of disasters could result in transformative political 
changes that reduce disaster risk, citing how the 1970 East Pakistan cyclone storm surge 
contributed to the growth of the Bangladesh independence movement, and how the 
governments of Niger and Ethiopia were unseated after their incompetence in handling the 
Sahel famine of the 1970s. The impact of climate change on hazards could have such a 
result. Therefore, though this analysis is conjectural, because some people will have such 
access to resources they will be largely unaffected by climatic changes, through creating 
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opportunities for new livelihoods, and via transformative changes in the aftermath of 
disasters, climate change will not necessarily increase disaster risk for everyone. 
5 Conclusion 
Climate change will increase disaster risk by affecting both the hazard and vulnerability sides 
of the PAR model. Climate change will exacerbate conditions for those who are already most 
vulnerable to disasters, whether through increasing the likelihood of the destruction of their 
physical environment, undermining people’s livelihoods and incomes, and contributing to 
rapid urbanisation. 
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How Can Unruly Politics Explain the Rise 
of Populism in the UK? 
Elena Wason 
1 Introduction 
The recent rise of populism in many Western countries has disrupted mainstream politics 
(Inglehart and Norris 2016). It has raised important questions, including what is causing this 
change in the political landscape, and how political actors can interpret and act on the 
demands being made by citizens supporting populism. In this essay I aim to investigate this 
field by analysing the rise of populism in the UK, interpreting what is being expressed 
through this phenomenon and why it has come about. I will argue that populism in the UK 
can be explained through an unruly politics lens: that populism is an unruly act to reject the 
left-right spectrum, and people are being unruly due to insecurity. This is argued from the 
standpoint of populism itself, regarding its aim to be unruly, as I acknowledge it could be 
analysed differently from other perspectives. I will specifically look at the cases of UKIP 
(United Kingdom Independence Party) and Brexit (the British exit from the European Union) 
to provide evidence for my argument. I will start by outlining the context, including defining 
populism and relating it to ideology, the left-right spectrum, and the case in the UK, and the 
four characteristics of unruly politics as my theoretical framework. I will then take each of 
these characteristics in turn, and show how it explains populism as relating to insecurity and 
rejecting left-right ideology. Finally, I will conclude that looking at populism through an unruly 
lens is vital to understand and address its root causes. 
2 Populism 
Whilst a broad and changing concept, Pollock et al. summarise populism as ‘forms of anti-
elitism and a cynicism towards those who are responsible for government’ (Pollock, Brock 
and Ellison 2015: 142). Mudde (2007) focuses on ‘radical right’ populism, which he 
operationalises into three main features: anti-establishment - resentment of authorities and 
belief in the wisdom of ordinary people over the ‘corrupt’ establishment, authoritarianism - 
favouring power of a strong, charismatic leader and majoritarian over representative 
democracy, reflecting the will of the people, and nativism – preferring monoculturalism, 
national self-interest and closed borders, and assuming ‘the people’ are uniform. This 
definition is useful for this analysis, however as will be explored below, does not represent 
the broader definition of populism. Inglehart and Norris (2017) equate populism to a 
fundamental change in society in recent decades. They cite the ‘silent revolution’ theory, 
stating that citizens in developed countries, due to high levels of economic security, have 
been changing their values to progressive movements, supporting minority rights and 
redistribution of wealth. However, this security has been compromised by a shrinking welfare 
state and neoliberal austerity (Inglehart and Norris 2016), and the rise in insecurity 
encourages a xenophobic, authoritarian reaction; this is because with more competition for 
scarce resources, people strive to fulfil their basic needs, and ‘struggle for survival against 
dangerous outsiders’ (Inglehart and Norris 2017: 1). I will apply this theory of insecurity as a 
catalyst for populism throughout my arguments. 
I argue in this essay that populism is a rejection of the left-right ideology. I define ideology 
simply as ‘a set of political beliefs about how society ought to be and how to improve it’ 
(Adams 2001: 2), and I refer to the left-right spectrum as programmatic ideologies on the 
distribution of wealth and economic inequality, with the left supporting greater redistribution 
(Lee 2013). Populism is often assumed to represent an ideology, and as demonstrated 
above, is especially associated with far-right politics. For instance, Mudde (2004) calls 
populism a ‘thin-centred ideology’, as it is not fully formed, but can still be placed on the 
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ideological spectrum. Others, however, argue that populism is not ideological in itself. Pollock 
et al. (2015: 145) argue that populist views have a lack of ‘ideological coherence’ that do not 
reflect a system of beliefs, rather the local and regional conditions, and therefore does not 
map onto the left-right spectrum. Similarly, Aslanidis (2016) calls populism a ‘discourse’ 
which rejects the dominant discourse, rather than an ideology, and Freeden (2017) says 
populism is not ideological because populist groups are not concerned with which topics form 
their rhetoric, they instead emphasise items which mobilise public opinion. This is important 
because I will argue that instead of being an ideology, populism is a manifestation of the 
disillusion with the traditional left-right ideology in the UK, which has disorientated and 
frustrated voters from across the spectrum; populism has risen to reject dominant ideologies, 
not to replace them. 
3 Populism in the UK 
The rise in popularity of the political party UKIP, and Brexit, referring to the referendum to 
British voters regarding membership of the EU (European Union), represent the recent 
growth of populism in the UK. UKIP rose to prominence in the 2015 general election, winning 
only one seat in parliament, but gaining 12.6% of the national vote (3.9 million votes): an 
increase of 9.5% since 2010 (BBC News 2015). UKIP is a populist party (Freeden 2017): it 
scores 91.8 / 100 on the CHES Populism Party Scale, with its main values described as pro-
market, socially conservative and deeply Eurosceptic (Inglehart and Norris 2016). This 
demonstrates its close connection with Brexit, where in 2016, 51.9% of the electorate voted 
to leave the EU, and UKIP played a significant role in this campaign (Swales 2016). The 
current ‘implosion’ of UKIP since Brexit proves its status as a populist party; its one-issue 
politics has led to it losing popularity since achieving its central aim of leaving the EU 
(Freeden 2017). Brexit was considered a populist vote; using the characteristics above, it 
was anti-establishment as the official government stance was to remain (Deloy 2016), so 
‘leave’ voters rebelled against the establishment, authoritarian as a direct democracy 
exercise of the will of the people, and nativist as the vote was swayed by matters of global 
integration: the three main issues concerning Brexit voters were immigration, sovereignty, 
and the economy (Swales 2012). It should be noted that not all UKIP and Brexit supporters 
have the intentions laid out in this analysis; I refer to generalised trends and hypotheses. I 
will investigate what explains this rise of UK populism, and explore it as a British form of 
unruly politics which aims to reject the left-right ideology. 
4 Unruly politics 
In the unruly politics manifesto, Shankland et al. define unruly politics as: ‘political action by 
people who have been denied voice by the rules of the political game, and by the social rules 
that underpin this game’ (Shankland et al. cited in Khanna 2012: 166), highlighting the 
demographic of those excluded from other forms of political and social participation. The 
manifesto outlines four main features of unruly politics. The first is it represents resource 
claims made by less powerful on more powerful actors, in situations of acute need and 
scarcity. The second is it lies outside of or jars with civil forms of democratic engagement: 
taking forms that are illegal, violent, disruptive of the social order, strident or rude. The third 
is that the actions illicit a response, or force official attention to the concerns being voiced. 
Finally, it represents a moral economy of entitlement and obligation, that encapsulates, 
constructs, and defends a powerful popular sense of fairness (Shankland et al. cited in 
Khanna 2012). An important unruly feature is that once an act has happened, it becomes 
incorporated as ‘politics’, and is no longer unruly (Khanna 2012). However, I intepret unruly 
politics slightly differently, incorporating acts as unruly which are performed within normal 
institutional parameters, however have the same intention and impact as unruly acts as 
defined above. I will now show how populism, although manifested through conventional 
political channels, can be explained through this unruly politics framework. I will address 
each feature of unruly politics in turn. 
 © 2018 The Author © Institute of Development Studies 75 
5 Resource claims 
The first feature of unruly politics I will analyse is resource claims made on powerful actors, 
in situations of scarcity. The populist votes of UKIP and Brexit can be argued to be a reaction 
to economic scarcity amongst certain groups, and a way of voicing concerns about the 
distribution of resources in the UK. Inglehart and Norris (2016) outline the ‘economic 
inequality thesis’, suggesting that populism is a consequence of globalisation, neoliberal 
austerity measures and a shrinking welfare state, causing rising economic inequality and 
social deprivation in developed countries. There are strong arguments that neoliberal policies 
implemented in the last 30 years have had such detrimental effects in the UK. Since the 
implementation of neoliberal politics – the free market, low taxes, and cutting welfare 
spending – there has been a steep rise in poverty, income inequality, and inequality of 
access to basic services (Fuchs 2016). Sivanandan (2013: 3) argues that the creation of a 
‘market society’ – emphasising individualism over social welfare – has structured inequality 
and poverty into the foundations of society, resulting in working class citizens ‘who have 
fallen off the edge’. 
Looking at the demographics of UKIP and Brexit supporters, populism could be a way of 
voicing discontent for this economic trend. In the Brexit vote, 66% of low-income voters, 70% 
of those in social housing, 59% of the working class, and 70% of those finding it difficult to 
manage financially, voted ‘leave’ (Swales 2016). These are all much higher than the average 
Brexit vote of 51.9%, and are all groups with fewer financial resources. Similarly, support for 
UKIP is more than twice as high among the working class than other social classes, and 
twice as high among those who say they are ‘really struggling’ on their current income, than 
those who say they are ‘really comfortable’ (Curtice and Ormston 2015). These suggest that 
economic resources are a factor in choosing to support populism, and insecurity, as 
hypothesised by Inglehart and Norris (2017), could have caused people to turn to 
xenophobia as a form of blame for increasingly uneven distribution of economic resources. 
Therefore, populism, as UKIP and Brexit support, could be explained by the unruly politics 
characteristic of excluded citizens making resource claims on the powerful actors they deem 
responsible for their economic insecurity. 
This unruly act of resource claims made on elites could be a rejection of traditional left-right 
politics, due to voter disillusion about which parties are supporting the working class and 
poorest citizens. Traditionally, the Labour party’s supporters are working class, less well-off 
citizens, attracted to the party through its socialist, left-wing leaning policies, which 
redistribute wealth to the poorest in society (Heath 2000). However, since it reinvented itself 
as ‘New Labour’ in 1997, the party has moved towards the centre of the ideological 
spectrum; Lee (2013) argues that the two main parties (Labour and Conservatives) have 
converged in the centre, occupying a smaller area of political debate. Heath (2000) suggests 
that this move of mainstream politics away from the socialist left has disillusioned traditional 
Labour supporters with less economic resources, who now lack a party representing their 
interests. This is supported by UKIP attracting disaffected former Labour voters: many voters 
alienated by New Labour’s move to centre ground voted for Conservatives in 2010, and then 
moved to UKIP in 2015 (Evans and Mellon 2016). This trend dispels the idea of voting 
according to the left-right spectrum, as a party that is considered ‘radical right’ is gaining 
votes from a former left-wing socialist party; whilst UKIP may be considered right-wing, this 
suggests that its supporters are making a desperate plea for resources, by skipping over the 
ideological spectrum. These disillusioned voters turned to populism to reject the left-right 
spectrum that has not worked for them, through an unruly act to highlight their economic 
insecurity. 
6 Outside of civil forms of democratic engagement 
The second feature of unruly politics is that it lies outside of civil forms of democratic 
engagement, and acts are illegal, violent, disruptive of the social order, strident or rude. 
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Voting in a referendum or supporting a political party are definitely not actions that lie outside 
of civil forms of democratic engagement; in fact, they are the most traditional and formal 
methods. However, to look at this differently, it can be argued that the intended outcome of 
the rise of populism, not the form of participation, jars with the norms and expectations of 
democratic engagement, and has disrupted the expected social order through ‘shaking up’ 
traditional electoral outcomes. It is also a reaction to democratic participation: Cumbers 
argues that the rise of UK populism is down to some citizens being marginalised from 
democratic engagement. He found that in OECD countries with higher poverty and 
inequality, citizens were more likely to be excluded from decision-making processes 
(Cumbers 2017). 
This disengagement from decision-making is evident amongst UKIP and Brexit supporters. 
Of those who agreed with the statement ‘politicians do not listen to people like me’, 58% 
voted for Brexit (Swales 2016). UKIP supporters have significantly higher levels of distrust of 
and disengagement with the government than supporters of other parties, and 70% of UKIP 
supporters agreed with the statement ‘people like me don’t have any say about what the 
government does’, compared with an average of 44% from all respondents (Curtice and 
Ormston 2015). This demonstrates the higher-than-average feeling among these groups that 
they are disconnected from the democratic decision-making process and feel they have been 
denied voice in democratic participation. This links into this group’s sense of insecurity, 
because if they do not trust the government to listen to their needs and guarantee their basic 
economic security, then they could turn to populism as a form of protesting. This unruly 
framework therefore helps explain populism, as some Brexit and UKIP supporters could aim 
to disrupt the social order of excluding certain citizens from standard democratic voice. 
Furthermore, populism is disruptive of the social order as it unsettles the standard ideological 
spectrum. Political rhetoric has long been dominated by positionality on this intangible scale 
of left and right, and many voters align themselves on the scale with political parties when 
casting votes (Pattie and Johnston 2009). However, as argued, populism does not map 
systematically onto this left-right political spectrum. Brexit has very little correlation with such 
ideological preferences of voters: 53% of people who identified themselves as ‘right leaning’ 
voted for Brexit, compared with 50% of those ‘left leaning’ (Swales 2016). Interestingly, UKIP 
supporters associate more with left values than Conservative supporters, aligning with 
Labour supporters. For example, 76% of UKIP supporters and 71% of Labour supporters feel 
that ‘ordinary people do not get their fair share of the nation’s wealth’, whilst only 41% of 
Conservative supporters agree; the report describes UKIP supporters as ‘far from on the 
right’ (Curtice and Ormston 2015). Whilst such statements are provocative in that they stir up 
a sense of injustice, which is associated with the anti-elite rhetoric of populism, these 
statistics nevertheless provide a picture of populism as not following the ingrained 
assumption in the UK that supporters can be placed on a scale from left to right, and 
necessarily follow the values of this position. This form of populism as questioning the left-
right assumption can therefore be explained by the unruly characteristic of disrupting 
expectations of the social order. 
7 Elicits a response 
The third feature of unruly politics is that actions elicit a response, or force official attention to 
specific concerns being voiced. In the UK, the government cannot ignore demands emerging 
from the rise of populism; as outlined above, it became a significant proportion of the 
population, which shifts crucial votes away from mainstream parties and politics. Prime 
Minister Theresa May gave a speech in January 2017 addressing economic concerns raised 
by populism, and matching populist rhetoric by blaming the establishment for neglecting the 
majority: she accused mainstream politicians of ‘ignoring the legitimate concerns of ordinary 
people for too long’ (Parker 2017). Similarly, the 2017 general election campaigning targeted 
people whose voices are not being heard: the three main parties all addressed the issue of 
voters feeling disconnected from power in their manifestos (Easton 2017). Inglehart and 
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Norris (2016: 2) outline how populism can exert huge ‘blackmail pressure’ on mainstream 
parties, public discourse, and the policy agenda: they give the example of how rising support 
for UKIP catalysed the government to hold a referendum on leaving the EU, and then were 
forced to follow up by implementing Brexit. This demonstrates populism driving a change in 
the national conversation about key issues being expressed, and the government feeling the 
need to respond to them, due to the strength of the threat populism poses to mainstream 
politics. 
Much of the government’s response to populism altering politics has been to address, 
rhetorically, concerns of economic insecurity (Parker 2017). However, this may be difficult in 
reality. If rising economic inequality and insecurity are caused by neoliberal structures, these 
are deeply entrenched in society, so a government on a short-term, five-year mandate may 
be unable, or unwilling, to take meaningful action. Either way, unruly politics provides an 
explanation of populist acts as a means to provoke a response from authorities. 
This manifestation of populism eliciting an official response can help make the case for a 
rejection of left-right politics. The rise of populism could represent people trying to provoke 
action from the government regarding their confusion over mainstream politics: particularly 
what parties represent and who to vote for. Dommett (2012) describes how even though the 
main UK parties do have ideological underpinnings, on the surface it appears to voters as a 
‘consensual, non-ideological agenda’, where parties are converging and it is difficult to 
distinguish them. Therefore, populism rejecting the left-right spectrum, as unruly politics 
suggests, could be a call for political actors to make parties more relatable and differentiated. 
8 Defends a powerful popular sense of fairness 
The final characteristic of unruly politics is that it represents a moral economy of entitlement 
and obligation, which builds a powerful, popular sense of fairness; in other words, it is 
generally accepted as an injustice worth fighting for. Populism embodies this feature from its 
own standpoint; it is based on expressing the needs of ‘the silent majority’, and emphasises 
the wisdom of ‘ordinary people’ (Inglehart and Norris 2016). It therefore uses the rallying cry 
of a sense of fairness of what is happening to people ‘like me and you’, through claims like 
‘we are the forgotten majority’, or even the Occupy movement’s slogan of ‘we are the 99%’ 
(Stelter 2011). This mobilises people by including them in suffering this great injustice, which 
creates a popular sense of fairness; it draws on people’s individual economic situations to 
create a collective moral sense of entitlement, by uniting those in the same situation, and 
othering and blaming people who are not. 
Building this popular sense of fairness has been done through playing on what Inglehart and 
Norris (2016) call the ‘cultural backlash thesis’. This is the idea that populism can be a 
reaction to progressive cultural change, which makes people feel threatened; this can cause 
them to react against multiculturalism, a key cultural change in recent decades, by blaming it 
for the inequality and economic insecurity faced by many. For instance, a recent UKIP slogan 
was ‘we want our country back’ (Nickerson 2016), and a frequently used phrase in the Brexit 
leave campaign was ‘take back control’ (Haughton 2016). These phrases play on people’s 
insecurities of being threatened by cultural change, and exacerbate the sense of entitlement 
and control over resources that were once in people’s hands and are no longer as easily 
available. Unruly politics explains populism in this sense of using rhetoric to defend and 
proliferate a depicted sense of injustice, creating a wave of support for the cause. 
Populism harbouring anger towards an unjust society could also be demonstrated by the 
rejection of left-right politics. Swales (2016: 15) contends that the Brexit debate was swayed 
not just by economic factors, but also by ‘views on acceptable social behaviour and moral 
fairness’, which cut across the ideological spectrum, incorporating left-leaning and right-
leaning voters. As outlined above, the left-right spectrum is often a deciding factor in voters’ 
preferences for parties and policies, however this result shows that a sense of moral fairness 
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has overridden traditional ideological preferences. Populism, therefore, has manipulated 
economic and social injustice, to cut through both left and right ideologies and deem them as 
irrelevant. By viewing this act through an unruly lens, it demonstrates how populism 
mobilises support by creating a collective and popular sense of moral entitlement for the 
‘forgotten many’, beyond the ideological spectrum. 
9 Conclusion 
Overall, this essay has used an unruly lens to explain the rise and aims of populism, to argue 
how it was caused by growing insecurity in the UK, and an important element to its 
expansion was a rejection of traditional left-right politics due to disillusion with the system. I 
have done this by systematically analysing populism through the main features of unruly 
politics; although populism is not a standard unruly act, I have argued that through using an 
unruly politics framework it is possible to understand both its underlying motivations and 
forms of functioning. This is important because populism is changing the face of politics in 
the UK; politicians need to understand what the electorate is expressing through support for 
UKIP and Brexit, and it may be that populism is a very British form of being unruly. Unruly 
politics is, by definition, a cry to be heard by people who do not feel that conventional 
decision-making processes allow them to communicate their needs. Therefore, by viewing 
populism as a form of unruly politics, it allows the recognition of underlying demands made in 
an unconventional manner to be heard, to bring the growing minority of populism supporters 
into a space where they can express their voices. 
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